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Just as a farmer tills the land, plants and nurtures the crops for a great
harvest, so too must the State take measures for the development of its
economy.
Abstract
Burdened by the remnants of conflict, continuing threats of security lapses,
significant market failures and weak institutions, post-conflict transition
countries can hardly be described as normal economies. The task of
transforming them into vibrant, productive, and self-sustaining economies is no
simple assignment. Constructing the blueprint for reconstruction and economic
development requires creativity of the first order. Conventional theories or pure
neo-liberal market driven policy levers preached by the Washington Consensus
Group are not likely to be productive. The design of the investment regime for
development should therefore focus on non-conventional policy constructs.
Contrary to the received theories, the history and evidence of conventional
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foreign direct investment ("FDI") as an engine of growth and development in
developing countries has been disappointing. It is doubtful whether such FDI
can play the necessary transformative role in countries facing more
extraordinary economic and political conditions than other developing countries.
What post-conflict transition countries need for their transformation is an
industrial strategic policy architecture that emphasizes domestic, value-added,
high-value investment demand targeting specific sectors and projects. Non-
conventional FDI policies should then play a complementary role to the domestic
investment demand for economic development. One type of non-conventional
FDI that can play a meaningful role in post-conflict transition countries is the
project finance model that incorporates irreversible build-operate-and-transfer
("BOT") or similar operations with the potential for the greatest development
impact. The BOT will be supported by a Post-conflict Guarantee Fund and
operated by sponsors for a limited time period. Any necessary FDI incentives
can then be constructed and directed at actual impediments to achieve the
specific developmental objectives of each country.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Prominent among the many challenges facing post-conflict transition
countries is how to design and implement the blueprint or strategic
architecture for transforming their economies into vibrant productive and
self-sustaining economies. Shattered by conflict or deprived of skilled labor
and capital from brain drain and capital flight, post-conflict economies are
seldom normal economies. Laboring under the weight of severe security
problems and significant market failures, they tend to be underperforming
economies characterized by rent-seeking, bureaucratic elite groups. In this
context, we must start with the notion that post-conflict transition countries
are in the second-best world. They suffer from many constraints and
distortions, particularly those relating to investments. In many of these
countries there might be weak financial institutions, poor access to capital or
low investment demand, either as a result of unattractive private
appropriability or low social returns on investment. Investments might also
be suppressed by the wrong perceptions of market size that can support
economies of scale. If weak institutions hamper entrepreneurial investments
in developing countries and are the root causes of underdevelopment, the
conditions of weak institutions in transition countries will be magnified at
least threefold. Consequently, transforming these economies is no ordinary
task. As one U.N. institution has put it, "extraordinary creativity in policy
design" and implementation is necessary.2 Conventional policy levers are
most likely ill-suited to the task. It is in this light we approach the issue of
the role of foreign direct investment ("FDI") in the transformation of post-
Dani Rodrik & Arvind Subramanian, Why Did Financial Globalization Disappoint?, 56
IMF STAFF PAPERS 112 (2009), available at
http://ksghome.harvard.edul-drodrik/WhyDid-FG Disappoint March_24_2008.pdf.
2 U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME [UNDP], SUSTAINING POST-CONFLICT ECONOMIC RECOVERY:
LESSONS AND CHALLENGES 2 (Oct. 2004) (BCPR Occasional Paper 1).
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conflict transition countries.
At the outset, it must be stressed that post-conflict transition countries
come in different forms. At one end of the spectrum are failed states such as
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Bosnia-
Herzegovina that are recovering from collapse and are on the path to some
level of security, stability, and legitimacy. At the other end of the spectrum
are countries that emerged from conflict with their political and other
institutions relatively intact. This category of states includes Guatemala, Sri
Lanka, and the former Yugoslav Republic. There is yet a third category of
post-conflict transition countries, such as Rwanda, that have managed to
reconstruct the essential institutions for transformation and have embarked
on what appears to be an irreversible path towards development. The last
category of post-conflict transition countries did not experience an outbreak
of violence that completely destroyed the state, but nevertheless continue to
experience sufficient levels of periodic violence to put them in the same
category as the others. It is this assemblage of states for which the question
is posed as to the role of FDI in their economic development and the extent
to which incentives for FDI might be relevant.
The answers to these questions demand a broader framing of the issues.
FDI is only a sub-category of the investment regime required to transform
these countries. Experience has shown that FDI flows to the least developed
countries are insignificant in comparison to other regions of the world.
Moreover, as appropriately pointed out by a World Bank study and the
experience of recent development success stories, development requires two
types of complementary investments: public and private. So, the critical
question is: what are the investment needs of post-conflict transition
countries if their economies are to be transformed into vibrant systems
within the larger global economy? The issue is framed more broadly to
draw attention to certain misconceptions about FDI and development.
What is important about FDI is its perceived beneficial impact on
development. It is often assumed that FDI will spur growth and induce the
transfer of technology and much needed know-how to the host country.
This perceived role gained greater credibility with the outstanding economic
performance of the Asian Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) such as
Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Malaysia.5  The
U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV. [UNCTAD], WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2007:
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES AND DEVELOPMENT at xV- XViii,
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2007, U.N. Sales No. E.07.II.D.9 (2007) [hereinafter UNCTAD,
WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2007].
4 WORLD BANK, GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE: MOBILIZING FINANCE AND MANAGING
VULNERABILITY 93-98 (2005), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGDF2005/Resources/gdf05complete.pdf
5 See, e.g., IL SAKONG, KOREA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (1993); Sung Yeung Kwack, The
Economic Development of the Republic of Korea, 1965-1981, in MODELS OF DEVELOPMENT
65 (Lawrence J. Lau, ed., 1986); Tibor Scitovsky, Economic Development in Taiwan and
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emergence of China and India as major economies on the rise has further
given greater prominence to the beneficial impact of FDI on development.6
However, the complexity of the underlying reasons for the success of the
Asian NICs does not permit any isolated categorical statement about the
impact of FDI on their development. Recent studies point to a host of
complex mixtures of macroeconomic and government market interventions
as significant contributing factors.7
Notwithstanding the multiplicity of contributing factors, the general
perceptions and assumed beneficial effects of FDI mask the complexity of
FDI and its role in economic development. Since the 1970s and 80s, various
studies have questioned the claims of FDI's positive impact on
development. The studies showed that the impact of FDI on development
is not always unambiguously positive. In other words, any benefits that
accrue from FDI may depend critically on the absorptive capacity of the host
country, the nature of the internal linkages created with the local economy,
the quality (high value) of the investment and, to a large extent, the role of
the host government in channeling or guiding the process toward specific
developmental goals.' Other studies challenged the efficacy of tax and other
fiscal incentives for attracting FDI. Indeed, one of these studies questioned
the theoretical foundations of tax incentive policies and concluded that not
only were tax and other fiscal incentives ineffective instruments for
attracting FDI, but they also provided a form of perverse reverse subsidies
from impoverished and weak recipient states to affluent capital exporting
countries.10 This irony of the poor subsidizing the wealthy through their
South Korea, 1965-1981, in MODELS OF DEVELOPMENT 135 (Lawrence J. Lau, ed., 1986).
6 See generally JUSTIN YIFu LIN, FANG CAI & ZHOU Li, THE CHINA MIRACLE:
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY AND ECONOMIC REFORM (1996) (discussing the strategy employed
for China's leap forward in economic reforms and the results of such reform).
See John Page, The East Asian Miracle: Four Lessons for Development Policy, in NBER
MACROECONOMICS ANNUAL 1994, at 219 (Stanley J. Fischer, & Julio J. Rotemberg, eds.,
1994); Dani Rodrik, Getting Interventions Right: How South Korea and Taiwan Grew Rich,
EcON. POL'Y, Apr. 1995 (explaining the complexities of the policy mix used by South Korea
and Taiwan for achieving development and riches); York W. Bradshaw, Young-Jeong Kim &
Bruce London, Transnational Economic Linkages, the State and Dependent Development in
South Korea, 1966-1988: A Time-Series Analysis, 72 SOCIAL FORCES 315 (1993) (explaining
the direct involvement of the State in development relying heavily on international trade);
Alwyn Young, The Tyranny of Numbers: Confronting the Statistical Realities of the East
Asian Growth Experience, 110 Q. J. ECON. 641 (1995) (examining the role of factor
accumulation in the extraordinary post war growth of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea,
and Taiwan).
8 Kojo Yelpaala, Costs and Benefits from Foreign Direct Investment: A Study of Ghana, 2
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 72, 91-97 (1980) [hereinafter Yelpaala, Cost and Benefits of
FDI].
9 Id. at 99; John H. Dunning, Re-evaluating the Benefits of Foreign Direct Investment,
TRANSNATIONAL CORPS., Apr. 1994 (Vol. 3), at 23, 32-33.
10 See Kojo Yelpaala, The Efficacy of Tax Incentives Within the Framework of the
Neoclassical Theory of Foreign Direct Investment: A Legislative Policy Analysis, 19 TEX.
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incentives for FDI should not be lost on policymakers confronted with the
difficult task of designing programs for transforming weak and
impoverished post-conflict states laboring under severe resource constraints.
Over two decades later, the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), in a most revealing study on FDI in Sub Saharan
Africa (SSA), not only questioned the perceived beneficial impact of FDI in
the region but also expressed serious skepticism about the utility of
conventional thinking on the subject in that region." There have been
occasions to comment briefly that although the recommendations of the
study were in the right direction, they were not bold enough. 12 However,
because many post-conflict transition countries are within Sub-Saharan
Africa and the call by UNCTAD for rethinking FDI has wider implications
beyond SSA, it will be useful to examine some of its core arguments. The
following observations deserve particular attention.
First, the UNCTAD study found that the SSA region is lagging behind
others in terms of the size, performance, and beneficial impact of FDI. 13
Second, contrary to familiar arguments, the unattractiveness of SSA and the
poor developmental impact of FDI in the region cannot solely be attributed
to the failure of market-oriented governance reforms. 14 Third, FDI carries
with it costs and benefits which must be critically assessed by policymakers
if host countries are to capture some of the hoped-for positive contributions
to their economic development objectives.15 Fourth, since the colonial era,
Africa has been the victim of FDI-led enclave economies, described
elsewhere as scoop and ship operations, particularly in the mining sector. 16
Extractive institutions that were established during the colonial era have
continued to burden African economies as constraints to development." It
is, therefore, hardly surprising that the UNCTAD study correctly observed
that any lack of sensitivity to this enclave phenomenon in FDI policy design
will entrench a relationship that has been least beneficial to the continent.
INT'L L.J. 365 (1984) [hereinafter Yelpaala, Efficacy ofTax Incentives].
" See UNCTAD, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: RETHINKING THE ROLE OF FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/GDS/AFRICA/2005/1, U.N. Sales No.
E.05.II.D.12 (2005) [hereinafter UNCTAD, RETHINKING FDI].
12 Kojo Yelpaala, In Search of a Model Investment Law for Africa, in 1 AFRICAN
DEVELOPMENT BANK LAW FOR DEVELOPMENT REVIEW 2, 74-75 (Seward M. Cooper et al.
eds., 2006) [hereinafter Yelpaala, Model Investment Law].
13 UNCTAD, RETHINKING FDI, supra note 11, at 4-5.
14 Id. at 2.
15 Id.
16 See Yelpaala, Model Investment Law, supra note 12, at 12 (explaining that "scoop and
ship" refers to "operations in which the resources of the host country are extracted, loaded
onto ships, and exported for processing in other countries").
17 Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, The Colonial Origins of
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369, 1376
(2001) (arguing that extractive institutions were necessitated by the inhospitable environment
for settlement but the extractive institutions survived independence of the colonies).
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Fifth, it also pointed out a major fallacy in current thinking that greater
openness and downsizing of the state will attract FDI. Not only has this
proved to be empirically false, but it also has the effect of distracting
policymakers from focusing on the fundamental determinants, drivers, or
theories of FDI and growth. 8 Sixth, following the steps of earlier studies
critical of incentives as instruments for FDI, the study concluded that tax
and other fiscal incentives might produce the perverse effect of subsidizing
the rich capital exporting countries and that the benefits to poor host
countries are highly questionable. 9 Finally, the study stressed that an FDI
policy cannot be justified merely because it provides the highest returns to
FDI. Rather, FDI can only be justified if it is high-value and contributes
significantly to technological spill-over effects or to jobs. Otherwise, FDI
might keep the host country in a low-level development trap.20
One of the inescapable lessons from the numerous studies of FDI's
impact on development is that left to its own devices, FDI is unlikely to
generate growth, lead to meaningful technology transfer, or create the
internal links necessary for the development of certain regions of the world.
In light of this, it is highly questionable whether the policy framework for
transforming post-conflict transition countries can rely on FDI as its central
focus. Indeed, as will be shown below, a brief review of the characteristic
attributes and distinctive behavior of foreign investors suggests that such
reliance would likely be unproductive.
The rest of this Article is divided into the following parts. Parts II and
III examine the patterns and basic characteristics of FDI in general and with
particular reference to post-conflict transition countries. Parts IV and V are
devoted to a systems analysis of the Multinational Enterprise ("MNE") and
the implications of that system to the development objectives of post-
conflict transition countries. Part VI focuses on the analysis of the essential
characteristics of an industrial policy architecture for transforming post-
conflict transition countries and the role of the "developmental State" in that
process. Part VII reconfigures the purpose of project finance for developing
privately managed industrial projects with the greatest developmental
impact. Part VIII explores the use of the build-operate-and-transfer
("BOT") model within the context of industrial project finance for
developing local enterprises and an entrepreneurial class. BOTs are
generally characterized by several risks, and Part IX addresses some of those
key risks. Given the novel approach to the use of non-conventional foreign
investment advocated in this Article, Part X explores what role incentives
might play in achieving the developmental objectives of host countries. Part
XI is devoted to concluding remarks and thoughts.
18 UNCTAD, RETHINKING FDI, supra note 11, at 35-36.
19 Id. at 2-3; Yelpaala, Efficacy of Tax Incentives, supra note 10, at 388, 392.
20 UNCTAD, RETHINKING FDI, supra note 11, at 36.
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II. PATTERNS IN GLOBAL FDI
In order to contemplate the role of FDI in the policy framework for
transforming post-conflict transition countries, it is important to start with
some understanding of the basic characteristics, patterns, and distinctive
behavior of FDI. It is essential for policymakers to determine how and
where post-conflict transition countries fit into the strategic vision of foreign
investors whose new conception of economic space and economic
geography spans the entire globe without regard to national borders. A
policy framework that does not take into account where and how these
countries fit into the recurrent mindset of foreign investors is likely to yield
minimal beneficial results and might even be detrimental to the
developmental objectives of the host country.
While the FDI phenomenon is becoming increasingly complex, there
are certain basic patterns that seem to characterize globally the flow of
FDI.21 First, several studies indicate that FDI tends to be highly
concentrated by region, by country, and by industry.22 For example, FDI
often originates from and flows to industries characterized by monopolistic
or oligopolistic market traits.23  Further, certain industrial market
characteristics and concentration at home are highly suggestive of the
investment location in foreign countries. Available statistical data from the
1950s to this date now confirms that this pattern of concentration, which
may be decreasing, has nevertheless been one of the most enduring
characteristics of the FDI phenomenon.24 For instance, in 1999, ten
countries received 74% of all FDI and six developing countries received
21 Yelpaala, Model Investment Law, supra note 12, at 17-19.
22 The concentration and compactness has been one of the enduring characteristics of FDI
since the data on the phenomenon has been collected. The United Nations Center on
Transnational Corporations [UNCTC] published a study of the salient features of FDI in
1983, which confirmed the pattern of concentration. The study that examined data from the
1960s to the 1970s demonstrated clearly that foreign investment tends to be concentrated in
developed countries both in terms of origin and destination. See UNCTC, SALIENT FEATURES
AND TRENDS IN FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT at 1-21, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/I4, U.N. Sales No.
E.83.Il.A.8 (1983).
23 Studies on the industrial organization characteristics of FDI found a high degree of
concentration of FDI in markets characterized by monopoly or oligopoly. See RICHARD E.
CAVES, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1982); STEPHEN HERBERT
HYMER, THE INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS OF NATIONAL FIRMS: A STUDY OF DIRECT FOREIGN
INVESTMENT (1976) (a seminal dissertation discussing the industrial characteristics, oligopoly
and monopoly, of foreign investors); FREDERICK T. KNICKERBOCKER, OLIGOPOLISTIC
REACTION AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE (1973); CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, AMERICAN
BUSINESS ABROAD: Six LECTURES ON DIRECT INVESTMENT (1969); Richard E. Caves,
International Corporation: The Industrial Economics of Foreign Investment, 38 ECONOMICA
1 (1971).
24 See generally Kojo Yelpaala, Legal Problems of Foreign Investments (1984)
(unpublished course materials, on file with author).
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80% of FDI going to those countries.25 Subsequent UNCTAD studies,
particularly the 2003 and 2004 World Investment Reports, confirm the
pattern of concentration and compactness of FDI.26 The World Investment
Report of 2007 announced that MNEs from developed countries remain the
main source of FDI, accounting for about 84% of the total FDI outflows. 27
The nature of the concentration of FDI is best captured in Figure 1 below.28
FIGURE 1
Figurel







400,000 O Developing Economies
0 Africa
200,000 jLatin America and Caribbean
0Asia and Oceania
0 HEWestAsia
2004 2005 12008 South-East Europe and CIS
FDI Inflos
0World 742,143 945,795 1,305,852
* Developed Economies 418,855 590,311 857,499
O Developing Economies 283,030 314,316 379,070
DAfica 18,018 29,648 35,544
M Latin America and Caribbean 94,290 75,541 83,753
E!Asia and Oceania 170,722 209,127 259,773
EWest Asia 20,839 41,554 59,902 Source: World Investment Report 2007BSouth-East Europe and CIS 40,258 41,169 69,283
In many respects, the FDI narrative provided by Figure 1 not only
confirms the historical patterns, but also demonstrates the stark differences
between the fortunes of developed countries and those of developing
25 UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT .2000: CROSS-BORDER MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS AND DEVELOPMENT at vi, U.N. Doe. UNCTAD/WIR/2000, U.N. Sales No.
E.00.II.D.20 (2000) [hereinafter UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2000].
26 See UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2003: FDI POLICIES FOR DEVELOPMENT,
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2003, U.N. Sales.
No. E.03.II.D.8 (2003) [hereinafter UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2003]; see also
UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2004: THE SHIFT TOWARD SERVICES at xvii-xxix,
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2004, U.N. Sales No. E.04.II.D.36 (2004) [hereinafter UNCTAD,
WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2004].
27 UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2007, supra note 3, at xv.
21 Id. at 251-54.
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countries. Between 2004 and 2006, the relative position of developing
countries and their poorer regions, particularly Africa, remained constantly
low. As is apparent from Figure 1, when the world FDI inflows in 2006
passed the $1 trillion mark, the FDI inflow to the entire continent of Africa
(the "Continent") was only about $36 billion. Certainly, the inflow of FDI
to Africa had doubled from what it was in 2004 ($18 billion). Nevertheless,
it is a sad commentary on the attractiveness of the Continent to FDI,
considering the rapid pace of liberalization of FDI policies in the region.
Given that many of the post-conflict transition countries are on the
Continent, the picture cautions against great optimism towards FDI's role in
their development and also demands great care in the design of an FDI
policy framework.29
Second, Figure 1 also confirms the notion that both the origin and
destination of FDI tends to be rich and affluent countries. In the post World
War II era, the United States, Canada, Western Europe, and Japan were
significant sources and destinations of FDI. Consistent with Vernon's
product cycle hypothesis, investors appeared interested then, as they are
today, in high per capita countries. 1 According to the UNCTAD World
Investment Report of 2007, the United States and other developed countries
within the European Union (EU) continue to receive a significant share of
FDI inflows.32 Third, foreign investment tends to be located in the richest
regions of rich countries. Fourth, FDI tends to go from rich countries to the
richest of the developing countries and tends to be located in the richest
regions of developing countries. 33 A series of studies, particularly the most
recent UNCTAD study of world foreign investment behavior, clearly
confirms the pattern.34 By rich, we mean not only the abundance of
financial resources, high per capita income, and large markets, but also the
abundance of natural resources which are attractive to resource-seeking
29 Id. at xvii-xviii; Yelpaala, Model Investment Law, supra note 12, at 74.
30 For a discussion of investment patterns in the post World War II era, see Yelpaala,
Efficacy of Tax Incentives, supra note 10 at 374-77. See also Obie G. Whichard, US. Direct
Investment Abroad in 1980, 61 SURV. CURRENT Bus. 20 (1981); William K. Chung &
Gregory G. Fouch, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States in 1980, 61 SURV.
CURRENT BUS. 40, 45 (1981).
31 See Raymond Vernon, International Investment and Trade in the Product Cycle, 80
Q.J. ECON. 190 (1966); see also Raymond Vernon, The Product Cycle Hypothesis in a New
Environment, 41 OXFORD BULL. ECON. & STAT. 255 (1979) (revising theory to take into
account new developments since 1966); Gary Hufbauer, The Multinational Corporation and
Direct Investment, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE: FRONTIERS FOR RESEARCH 253,
260 (P. Kenen ed., 1975); UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2007, supra note 3, at 25-
26.
32 UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2007, supra note 3, at xv.
3 Yelpaala, Model Investment Law, supra note 12, at 17.
34 See generally UJNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2003, supra note 26; UNCTAD,
WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2004, supra note 26; UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT
2007, supra note 3.
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investors or scoop and ship operations. 5  Since 2004, UNCTAD has
observed a growing trend in the size or levels of South/South FDI; that is,
FDI from some developing countries to other developing countries.36
However, it is important to stress that south-south investments exhibit the
same type of concentration described here. Fifth, FDI in Africa is also
highly concentrated with only a few resource-rich countries, such as Angola
and Nigeria, accounting for a substantial portion of it.38 Finally, a careful
review of studies of FDI in least developing countries ("LDCs"), landlocked
countries ("LLCs"), and Sub-Saharan African countries ("SSACs") exhibit
the same basic characteristics discussed above.
The pattern of FDI described so far reveals an important lesson that
should not escape the attention of any policy specialists charged with
transforming post-conflict transition countries into productive and
sustainable economies. It is "abundantly clear from this pattern that foreign
investors are cold-hearted capitalists motivated by profit and the desire to
maximize the value of their firms." 40 They have developed a global mindset
that views the world as a single economic space. To them, economic
geography is borderless, stateless, and with few, if any, insurmountable
cultural limitations. With the right strategic vision, the resources of the
world, including cultural differences, can be exploited to enhance the firm's
value. In vogue is a capitalist philosophy that has reduced the parameters of
management decision processes to the very narrow confines of the interest
of the firm, its owners, and managers. The constituent interest groups do not
3s Yelpaala, Model Investment Law, supra note 12, at 17.
36 See generally UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2004, supra note 26; see also
UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2007, supra note 3.
37 UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2004, supra note 26, at 19-29.
3 In 1996, UNCTAD issued a report on the FDI picture in Africa. That report confirmed
the concentration of FDI in only a few African countries. Between 1985 and 1995, only
Nigeria and Egypt absorbed about 50% of FDI going to Africa. In 1985, the peak year for
FDI, only the five oil producing countries accounted for a significant portion of it. In 1989,
two countries accounted for about 92% of FDI in Africa. See 5 UNCTAD, WORLD
INVESTMENT DIRECTORY 1996: AFRICA at xvii, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/1997/5, U.N.
Sales No. E.97.II.A.1 (1997); UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2000, supra note 25,
at 40-45 (describing the concentration of FDI in a few countries, e.g., Angola, Egypt,
Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, and Tunisia); UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2004,
supra note 26, at xviii (noting a concentration in natural-resource-rich countries such as
Angola, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, and South Africa); see generally U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, SELECTED DATA ON U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD, 1950-1976 (Feb. 1982)
(providing the wide spectrum of investment activities by region, country, and industry); ORG.
FOR EcoN. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], INVESTING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 20 (5th rev.
ed. 1983).
3 See generally UNCTAD, FDI in Least Developed Countries at a Glance, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/3 (2001) [hereinafter UNCTAD, FDI in LDCs]; UNCTAD, FDI in
Landlocked Developing Countries at a Glance, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2003/5 (2003)
[hereinafter UNCTAD, FDI in LLDCs].
40 Yelpaala, Model Investment Law, supra note 12, at 18.
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extend to the state, labor, consumers, or other stakeholders. The mission
and responsibilities of management do not include spurring economic
development, although investment activities may have such spillover effects.
As described elsewhere, investment decisions are motivated by what may be
termed as purer forms of capitalist rationality, which compels investors to
seek out the most lucrative markets and business opportunities wherever
they may be found.41 Modem corporate governance, management theories,
and practice subscribe to this capitalist rationality as the norm. It is assumed
that shareholders of enterprises engaged in foreign investment expect and
demand this capitalist mentality in corporate managers. It is also assumed
that "social policy concerns, which often occupy the attention of
governments and legislatures, seldom, if ever, take center stage in the
calculations of shareholders interested in FDI."42
III. PATTERNS OF FDI IN POST-CONFLICT TRANSITION
COUNTRIES
If policymakers of post-conflict transition countries are faced with the
investor mindset described above, to what should they look to inform their
policy design for transforming those countries if they must rely on FDI? As
pointed out above, post-conflict transition countries are not normal
economies. Most of them are burdened by significant market failures,
relative small market size, severe economic constraints, and failed or weak
institutions, all of which are necessary components of a well-functioning
economy. Many of them fall into the category of countries described as
least developed; they are located in SSA, some of them are landlocked
countries and a few of them may be suffering from the natural resource
curse.43 Although there are no available statistics dedicated to this group of
countries, one can get a sense of their FDI attractiveness from an
examination of the categories they fall into.
A study by UNCTAD of FDI in LDCs provides a general picture of
FDI flows to LDCs and flows to specific countries, some of which are in
41 See id; Robert B. Reich, Who is Us?, HARv. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 53.
42 Yelpaala, Model Investment Law, supra note 12, at 18.
43 Joseph E. Stiglitz offers some interesting examples of the natural resource curse. The
czarist Azerbaijan suffered from the curse at the turn of the twentieth century and even today,
many resource rich countries have poor citizenry. Such countries include Nigeria, Peru,
Venezuela, Mexico, Papua New Guinea, and others. In 1975, the number of people in
Nigeria living on less than $1 a day was about 19 million. In 2000, that number reached 84
million. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK 133-37 (2006). Jeffrey
Sachs and others have also studied this phenomenon in developing countries. See generally
Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, Natural Resource Intensity and Economic Growth, in
DEVELOPMENT POLICIES IN NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMIEs 13 (Jorg Mayer et al. eds., 1999);
Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, Natural Resources and Economic Development: The
Curse ofNatural Resources, 45 EURo ECON. REv. 827 (2001); Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M.
Warner, The Big Push, Natural Resource Booms and Growth, 59 J. DEv. ECON. 43 (1999).
34
Rethinking the FDI Process and Incentives
30:23 (2010)
post-conflict transition." It is observed that in the 1990s, LDCs appeared to
be more attractive to foreign direct investors than in previous decades. For
instance, the annual growth rate of FDI to these countries was about 20%,
and they seemed to be keeping pace with the annual growth rate of FDI to
developing countries, which stood at about 22%.45 While this annual growth
rate of FDI might be indicative of the future attractiveness of these countries
to FDI, what is of interest to policymakers in developing countries and post-
conflict transition countries is not so much the size of FDI flows, but rather
their impact on and contribution to the developmental objectives of the host
country. This requires a closer examination of the data.
It would appear that the general positive trend of FDI flows to LDCs
masks certain specific, troublesome indicators. For instance, FDI flows to
LDCs constituted but a very small fraction of total FDI flows to the world
and to other developing countries. From 1986 to1990, FDI flows to LDCs
constituted only 0.4% and 2.2% of the FDI flows worldwide and to
developing countries, respectively.46 By 1999, the share of LDCs in world
FDI dropped to 0.3%, but its share of total flows to developing countries
increased slightly to 2.4%.4 Consistent with the location patterns of FDI, it
is hardly surprising that LDCs do not appear to be very attractive to FDI. To
the extent that many of the post-conflict transition countries fall into this
category, one must ask how much energy should be devoted to attracting
FDI, unless it is deliberately targeted at some specific industrial policy
objectives.
FDI flows to post-conflict transition countries face additional
difficulties that are specific to those countries and to developing countries in
general. First, some countries, such as Angola and the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC), are endowed with significant mineral resources,
particularly in petroleum and mining. Others, such as Liberia and Sierra
Leone, are known for their diamond deposits. All of these countries stand to
attract FDI in those sectors. Unfortunately, it is also precisely because of
these resources that there might be capital flight or FDI might be of the
wrong origin or the wrong type. In a country such as Sierra Leone,
divestments exceeded new investment flows in the 1990s.48 The DRC
experienced significant fluctuations between negative and positive inflows
during this period. It is reported that the current government of the DRC is
even engaged in various forms of infrastructure for natural resources barter
investment schemes with foreign governments and their investors
reminiscent of the classic scoop and ship investments.4 9 In other countries,
" UNCTAD, FDI in LDCs, supra note 39, at 1-20.
45 Id. at 2.
46 Id. at 3.
47 id.
48 Id. at 7.
49 Chinese investments in the DRC are receiving mixed reviews. Although there are
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FDI may come at a significant cost. Those resources may be in the hands of
incompetent bureaucrats or captured by elite interest groups working in
cohorts with foreign investors for siphoning away valuable natural resources
in scoop and ship investment operations, with little beneficial impact on the
development of the host country. Second, their natural resource
endowments may also put them in the paradoxical position of suffering from
underdevelopment precisely because of their riches, a phenomenon
generally referred to as the Dutch Disease,5 discussed in greater detail later.
This is a problem claimed to be a perverse characteristic of mineral-rich
countries where abundant natural resource endowments may be a curse, not
a blessing." There is, however, another category of countries, such as
Angola and Liberia, which seem to have attracted FDI even in their
condition as post-conflict transition countries. A closer look at that picture
reveals FDI behavior very much consistent with the patterns observed
elements of creativity, there is also much fear that they are essentially scoop and ship
operations and may ultimately generate more tension with the local communities than would
be mutually beneficial. The context and circumstances of the investments are complex, and
there is not much concrete data for a careful, balanced analysis. For the issues raised, see
John Farmer & Ann Talbot, China Steps up Investment in Congo as War in East Continues,
WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SITE, July 15, 2008,
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2008/jul2008/cong-jl5.shtml (reporting a $9 billion investment
deal between China and the DRC in which some of the funds would be used for infrastructure
development and mines renovation in return for some minerals); and Tim Whewell, China to
Seal $9 billion DR Congo Deal, BBC NEWS, Apr. 14, 2008,
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/7343060.stm (outlining the $9 billion
China-DRC deal). For some general information on Chinese investment issues in Africa, see
Lydia Polgreen & Howard W. French, China's Trade in Africa Carries a Price Tag, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 21, 2007, at Al (discussing the effects of Chinese trade with Africa, such as
increased production in Zambia's copper mines, but closed textile factories due to Chinese
imports); Richard Behar, Mining Copper in Zambia, FASTCOMPANY.COM, June 2008,
http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/126/zambia-chinas-mine-shaft.html?page=0%2CO;
Richard Behar, Mineral Wealth of the Congo, FASTCOMPANY.COM, June 2008,
http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/126/congo-a-moment-of-truth.html [hereinafter
Behar, Mineral Wealth of the Congo] (suggesting some local resistance to the Chinese
investments); and Richard Behar, China Saps Mozambique of Timber Resources,
FASTCOMPANY.COM, June 2008, http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/126/mozambique-a-
chain-saw-for-every-tree.html (suggesting some locals workers are angry over unfair
treatment by Chinese investors). Perhaps one of the most provocative and disturbing online
stories is by Peter Hitchens, How China Has Created a New Slave Empire in Africa, MAIL
ONLINE, Sept. 28, 2008, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1063198. One
of the difficulties facing scholars is lack of concrete information on Chinese investments in
Africa that can inform careful analysis. Without such information, these stories will drive the
debate, perhaps to everyone's mutual detriment.
so Jeroen J. M. Kremers, The Dutch Disease in the Netherlands, in NATURAL RESOURCES
AND THE MACROECONOMY 96-136 (J. Peter Neary & Sweder van Wijnbergen eds., 1986);
U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Africa [ECA], Managing Mineral Wealth 22 (2004), available at
http://www.uneca.org/ecaresources/Publications/sdd/Mining %20modules_final.pdf.
5' ECA, supra note 50, at 22 (summarazing various studies of the impact of mineral
resources and concluding that being mineral resource poor may be an advantage for a country
because the urban and political elite may engage in rent seeking rather than rent creation).
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above. With significant petroleum reserves, Angola has always been
attractive to FDI, despite its post-conflict status, particularly in an era of
high energy demand and short supply. 52  Liberia has also experienced
relatively high spikes in its FDI inflows during this period, mostly due to
Japanese investments aimed at exploiting the tax haven status of Liberia.
By any definition of the term, Liberia has been for decades, a tax haven
attractive to flag of convenience investments. Liberia does not levy any
taxes on the foreign source income of Liberia corporations. Finally,
landlocked and small post-conflict transition countries, such as Rwanda,
face certain constraints in attracting conventional FDI. Not only are their
markets too small, but they also face legal questions regarding transit rights
if they ship their products by land to foreign markets.
As a group, there are certainly differences in the conditions of post-
conflict transition countries. However, what emerges from the general and
specific analysis of FDI inflows is a picture which screams at policymakers
to pay attention if they want to utilize FDI in the development and economic
transformation of these countries. It is obvious that unless great creativity is
invoked, an industrial policy design that focuses on FDI in its conventional
form is likely to be ineffective and disappointing in results and impact.
Transforming post-conflict transition countries should be, in the words of
Easterly, "homegrown," based primarily on a domestic industrial policy
crafted by "searchers" within the swamps of local conditions.5 4  In this
context, searchers are those policymakers looking for the type of high-value
FDI that can make positive contributions to the transformation of the
swamp.
Being homegrown does not mean an inward-looking policy. Rather,
the industrial policy should take into account the resources of the global
marketplace as playing a complementary and supporting role. It seems
counterintuitive to call on countries that have been devastated by conflict to
take their fate into their own hands, but the transformation of post-conflict
transition countries cannot be achieved by outside "planners" relying
primarily on conventional FDI.55 The necessary transformation can best be
achieved by the hands of locals with the savvy and adaptability to take only
those FDI resources that will assist them in the task at hand.
If the resources of developing countries have been used, exploited, and
adapted to keep the industrial engines of many countries running for
centuries, has the time not come for developing countries to take a page
from self-reliant industrial strategies of successful countries, many of which
they have supported to their own detriment with their raw materials? This is
52 UNCTAD, FDI in LDCs, supra note 39, at 6-7, 10.
5 Id. at 10.
5 WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN: WHY THE WEST'S EFFORTS TO AID
THE REST HAVE DONE So MUCH ILL AND So LITTLE GOOD 6 (2006).
5s Id. at 17.
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the crucial question to be faced by policymakers. Even though conditions in
these countries might be dim, optimism must guide the policy design and
implementation. A general FDI policy bundled with generalized incentives,
as is rampant in the incentives regimes construct, does not immediately
suggest itself.
IV. SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF FDI
The argument made so far is not that FDI cannot contribute to the
economic development of a host country. Rather, it is that FDI in one
country may contribute to the development of other countries, while at times
imposing a cost on the host country. Further, it is also argued that in order
for FDI to transform developing countries, particularly post-conflict
transition countries, some positive and proactive measures must be taken to
ensure that FDI fits into some domestic investment demand systems, such
that FDI creates the necessary spill-over effects and internal linkages with
the local economy. It will be argued later that FDI in its conventional form
is unlikely to deliver the goods. The importance of these points is best
illustrated by the internalization theory of MNEs, which is essentially a
systems theory of FDI. Most of the major foreign direct investors that hold
great promise for a positive transformative impact on the economies of host
countries are MNEs.
According to the internalization theory of the MINE, MNEs exist as a
result of a Coasian transaction cost analysis on the rise of the firm within
open market transactions.56 In other words, just as the origin of the firm is
traceable to the minimization of transaction costs in dealing with open
markets, similarly can the origin of FDI be traced to the avoidance of costly
market imperfections by MNEs. MNEs engage in FDI through subsidiaries
to create their own internal markets to circumvent various market
imperfections associated with dealing with open market transactions in the
primary and intermediate goods markets. In this sense, FDI is triggered by
certain failures of contract law." Put differently, FDI is used to avoid
various contract performance difficulties associated with dealing with
independent parties in the open markets. FDI involves long term
relationships which, if carried out through third-party contracts, would be
obligationally and contingently incomplete. In other words, the parties
could not specify all their obligations, nor could they adequately address all
future contingencies in the contract. Thus, long term contracts are generally
56 See generally R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
5 See PETER J. BUCKLEY & CASSON, THE FUTURE OF THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE
32-65 (1976); JOHN H. DUNNING, INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION AND THE MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISE 3 (1981); see also Kojo Yelpaala, In Search of Effective Policies for Foreign
Direct Investment: Alternatives to Tax Incentive Policies, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 208, 214-
20 (1985) [hereinafter Yelpaala, Alternatives to Tax Incentive].
58 Yelpaala, Alternatives to Tax Incentive, supra note 57, at 221.
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incomplete and burdened by bounded rationality. 9
Through FDI, MNEs are able to bypass the problems of incomplete
contracts and bounded rationality. This is more so when the investment in
the host country involves asset specificity. Asset-specific investments tend
to expose MNEs to certain vulnerabilities. They suffer from what has been
described as a lock-in effect--once invested, they cannot easily be converted
60to other uses. In the event of liquidation, their salvage value is minimal as
compared to the initial cost of investment. Whether that asset specificity is
of a dedicated, site-specific, or cheek-by-jowl (side-by-side or close-
proximity complementary) nature, the investor is exposed to a variet of ex
post contractual opportunism or expropriation by the host country. The
MNE system minimizes these risks through integration or internalization.
Other market imperfections the MNE has to plan for involve raw
materials supply contracts, which may present quality and delivery problems
62that cannot easily nor adequately be solved by contractual provisions.
Moreover, the use of alternative market entry options such as licensing may
also be fraught with various difficulties. Licensing of firm-specific
intangible assets involves the use of information markets, which are almost
always imperfect and characteristically burdened by the Arrow's paradox.63
Price negotiations and performance are likely to be affected by ex ante and
ex post opportunism, a phenomenon that has engaged the attention of
institutional economists such as Oliver Williamson, the winner of the Nobel
Prize in economics in 2009. 4 Thus, technology, know-how, and other
intangible assets that are essential for transforming countries are not easily
handled in open market transactions involving independent third parties.
Besides, it is often better to use FDI as a technique for minimizing the cost
of exporting through tariff skipping.
Faced with these market imperfections, the MNE, through FDI,
integrates, internalizes, or brings under its ownership and control all those
activities for which it could not rely on the open market to achieve its
corporate strategic vision efficiently or effectively. 65 The internalization
theory of FDI is therefore a deliberate choice of investment activities that
59 OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS,
MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 54 (1985) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS]; OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 22-23 (1975) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND
HIERARCHIES].
60 WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 59, at 54.
61 Id.
62 See BUCKLEY & CASSON, supra note 57, at 40-41; Yelpaala, Alternatives to Tax
Incentive, supra note 57, at 221-22.
63 Yelpaala, Alternatives to Tax Incentive, supra note 57, at 220-34.
6 WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 59, at 21-22.
65 BUCKLEY & CASSON, supra note 57, at 37; Yelpaala, Alternatives to Tax Incentive,
supra note 56, at 254-58.
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links countries into the corporate network or system of operations. While
there is some debate over whether internalization constitutes a general
theory of the MNE and FDI, 66 its systems characteristics are of great
importance to policymakers charged with ensuring that FDI contributes
positively to the economic development and transformation of their
countries. An appreciation of the response to these market imperfections
and the specific assets vulnerabilities by MNEs is critical for sound policy
design.
It is obvious from the discussion so far that FDI by any MNE does not
necessarily constitute a simple isolated investment in the host country.
Rather, each FDI operation forms part of a system, a network of
interdependent and interconnected operations pursuing a general MNE
corporate strategic vision. The system provides the parent with great
flexibility because it operates essentially an internal market of its own,
which excludes outsiders and the open market from its intra-firm
transactions. Through this internal market, it can shuttle its resources within
the system to achieve various objectives which would have been difficult, if
not impossible, if it had to rely on third parties in an open market setting.
This does not mean that the FDI operations constitute a completely closed
system. The internalization theory states that where the market will work
well, the MNE will rely on outsourcing, delocalization, and other forms of
external open market transactions. What is important to note is that these
transactions that rely on other efficient producers, wholesalers, or channels
of distribution, are not FDI based. The MNE and its FDI system are best
captured in Diagram 1 below.
66 See, e.g., Peter J. Buckley & Pervez N. Ghauri, Globalisation, Economic Geography,
and the Strategy of Multinational Enterprises, 35 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 81 (2004); Peter J.
Buckley, The Limits of Explanation: Testing the Internalization Theory of the Multinational
Enterprise, 19 J. INT'L BUS. STUD. 181 (1988).
67 See generally Buckley, supra note 66; Buckley & Ghauri, supra note 66.
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DIAGRAM 1
As is apparent from Diagram 1, the MNE system has a spider web
structure that may be composed of different clusters of subsidiaries that are
both interconnected and interdependent. The network is also centralized and
decentralized at the same time, thereby capturing its monocentric and
polycentric characteristics not shown in the diagram. In the center of the
68 Kojo Yelpaala, Strategy and Planning in Global Product Distribution-Beyond the
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MNE is the parent with six wholly-owned subsidiaries. S and s3 are supplier subsidiaries. S2
and S4 are manufacturing subsidiaries. 85 Is a tax haven subsidiary and SO Is a sales
subsidiary in the target market. This structure provides flexibility which permits the MNE to
manage Its Investments, shuttle resources, and shift production and transactions among
subsidiaries and with the parent corporation and within the entire system. The manufacturing
subsidiaries (S2 & 84) may have technology tranfer arrangements. The supplier subsidiaries
may have similar arrangements. The system is set up to facilitate intra-firm transactions and
flow of value within the system. The distribution of the welfare effects among the countries in
the system is not unambigously positive to any of them.
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web, the parent corporation is surrounded by its immediate group of
subsidiaries, and together they form a corporate group. These subsidiaries
may be vertically or horizontally integrated in the same line of business as
the parent, thereby constituting a unitary business system in a narrow sense
of the term. When the INE system is composed solely of a parent and a
group of closely integrated subsidiaries as shown in Diagram 1, it may be
described as having a unitary structure or the U-Form, referred to above as
monocentric.
In the U-Form, the parent corporation tends to play a direct and
dominant role in the establishment and operations of the subsidiaries. By
setting the strategic vision of the group and through technology transfer,
loans, and other transactions with the subsidiaries, the parent maintains
direct links with them beyond its share interest. Each subsidiary may be
strategically designed to play a certain role in the system and in the
achievement of various corporate objectives. Individual subsidiaries may
then be required to sacrifice profits to enhance some group objective, such
as capturing a better group market position or achieving higher overall group
profitability. The intimacy of the relationships within the U-Form is further
facilitated by integration which also enhances interdependence and
interconnectedness. As pointed out above, integration eliminates some of
the vulnerabilities inherent in asset specificity. But intimacy between parent
and subsidiaries and among subsidiaries in the U-Form only emphasizes the
group and systems character of the MNE.
Although the typical major NINE has hundreds of subsidiaries within
the system of geographically dispersed operations, Diagram 1 illustrates
only a simplified version of the system of flexibility in the FDI system. In
Diagram 1, there are six subsidiaries: two raw materials supplier
subsidiaries, two manufacturing subsidiaries, one subsidiary in the target
market, and one in a tax haven. Generally, the larger the number of
subsidiaries in each category, the greater the flexibility of the parent because
it can shift or shuttle resources within them in response to various geo-
political conditions. It can also engage in income stripping and various
transfer pricing practices to benefit the group by realizing higher profits in
low tax regions, in this case, the tax haven subsidiary.
From the policymakers' point of view, it is critical to ask why the
system might be vertically and horizontally integrated with geographically
dispersed raw materials and manufacturing subsidiaries. To some extent,
the answer appears to lie in the actual or perceived vulnerabilities associated
with locating irreversible, high-value, and asset-specific investments in a
single country. FDI in a single country, which involves both site-specific or
cheek-by-jowl operations and the extraction and procession of raw
materials, may be perceived as exposing the investor to the asset-specific
vulnerabilities discussed above. From the MNE's point of view, such
complementary investments provide the host country with a complete
production system and an invitation for post-investment direct or indirect
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expropriation. At the very least, the perceived incentives for post
contractual opportunism are magnified.
We recognize that geographically dispersed, site-specific investment
may be designed to achieve many other MNE objectives, such as taking
advantage of low labor costs and high productivity and quality. However, in
many developing countries, the concerns of MNEs may lead to a strategic
fragmentation of their operations. This is perhaps best captured by the
aluminum industry in Ghana, where there is a smelter that produces ingots
from bauxite imported from Jamaica, and the finished products are
manufactured in the U.S. 69 Although the reasons for locating the smelter in
Ghana are numerous, the fragmentation of the industry reduces the
vulnerabilities of the MINE not only in Ghana, but also in Jamaica. Anyone
vaguely familiar with the political economy of Ghana at the time the smelter
was built will immediately appreciate the significance of that decision
within the context of the asset-specific vulnerabilities analysis.7 0
It would therefore appear that the system as described above makes
sense within the framework of the mission or strategic vision of the MNE.
As discussed above, managers of MNEs see their tasks as putting the
corporation in the best position to increase the value of the firm. The pursuit
of these corporate objectives may not advance any specific objectives of the
host countries in the system. Indeed, the accretion and the distribution of the
benefits of the MINE system among the countries in the system may be
uneven or inequitable. The countries that contribute the most to the value of
the enterprise may be the recipients of the least benefits. Such might be the
case of the raw-materials-supplying countries where the operations of the
subsidiaries are simply scoop and ship with no internal linkages with the
local economy. Since there is no local procession, there is no local value-
added activity, nor does the host country gain from technology transfer,
know-how creation, or learning-by-doing. 1 These are the very activities
that could help in the transformation of a country. On the other hand, the
host countries in which the processing or manufacturing takes place stand to
gain, perhaps at the expense of the supplier countries. They benefit from the
technology transfer and the positive spillover effects of manufacturing.
They also gain from the value-added activities and the linkage with the local
economies. Moreover, a tax haven country may perhaps be called a
parasitic state that benefits from the values created in the other countries and
from the consequential capital accumulation and positive balance of
payments accounts when no associated activities take place within its
borders.
What should be stressed is that, notwithstanding the spread of
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investment liberalization policies and bilateral investment treaties in the last
decade, countries do not necessarily control when and how they become part
of the system. The choice of which countries are brought into the MNE
system is essentially the choice of the parent MNE based on how each
country can contribute to its strategic objectives. However, and equally
important, is the fact that the uneven distribution of benefits among the
countries in the system is a consequence of the corporate strategy, but not
necessarily based on some deliberate calculation of the parent MNE.
V. POST-CONFLICT TRANSITION COUNTRIES AND THE MNE
SYSTEM
In the context of post-conflict transition countries, three countries,
Angola, the DRC, and Liberia, best exemplify the nature of the FDI flows to
post-conflict transition countries and the role of these countries in the MNE
network of subsidiaries. The flow of FDI is captured in Figures 2 and 3
below merely as suggestive evidence because there is no available and
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The purpose of Figure 2 is to demonstrate the relative insignificance of
FDI flows to post-conflict transition countries in Africa even as the
Continent as a whole has remained largely unattractive to FDI relative to the
rest of the world. With the exception of Angola, which is an oil-producing
country, the experience of other countries with FDI is significantly dwarfed
by the $35 billion FDI flows to the continent as a whole in 2006.
However, Figure 3 below provides a much more dramatic depiction of
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The dominant theme in Figure 3 is the volatility in the FDI flows to
these countries which imposes severe challenges on policymakers seeking to
assign a sustained developmental role to FDI. Volatility in FDI flows might
suggest some crisis of confidence in the political and security conditions in
these countries, which would inhibit irreversible, specific-asset investments.
Volatility in FDI flows might also be indicative of transitory investment in
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high risk and high returns activities, which often visit significant negative
consequences and have anti-development impacts on the host country.
As an oil-producing country, Angola is by far the most attractive to FDI
in this sample of countries and shares that level of attractiveness with other
72
oil producing countries on the continent. Even so, Angola also suffers
from the same swings in investment flows. In 2003, FDI in Angola reached
its peak in the era with $3.5 billion, only to be followed by declines
culminating in significant negative inflows three years later. Liberia and the
DRC experienced lower levels of volatility. What is perhaps significant
about the DRC is that the country is reported to be endowed with significant
quantities of all minerals known to mankind, yet the FDI flows to that
country are hardly reflective of its potential.n On the other hand, FDI flows
to Sierra Leone show an insignificant but crawling upward trend. In short,
whatever the reasons for this FDI volatility, it does not bode well for a
country trying to rely on FDI as an instrument for development.
All of the countries examined here have been part of the network of
countries brought into the MNE system as suppliers of raw materials and
Liberia also as a tax haven. Even during its internal conflict, Angola
remained attractive to foreign investors, primarily in the petroleum sector.
In its post-conflict transition phase, Angola has remained one of the leading
overall recipients of FDI in Africa, but still primarily in the petroleum
sector.74 Endowed with significant amounts of extractive natural resources,
the DRC has been attractive to natural-resource-seeking FDI.75 However,
with weak institutions, persistent post-conflict security challenges, poor
governance, and without an industrial strategic policy architecture of the
type advocated for in this study, the DRC seems to have had flirtations with
perhaps the wrong types of foreign investors in its extractive industries. As
raw material suppliers, neither country benefits from value-added activities,
technology transfer, and linkages with their local economies. The case of
the DRC deserves particular attention. In the normal context, raw material
supplier countries in the MNE system do not stand to benefit significantly
when they are purely in that role. In the case of the DRC, the continuing
tensions and administrative difficulties the country faces raise serious
questions about what benefits it can even reap from its position as supplier
72 UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2003, supra note 26, at 34 (discussing the
concentration of FDI in Africa, predominantly in oil-rich countries such Nigeria, Angola,
Chad, and Tunisia).
7 See Behar, Mineral Wealth of the Congo, supra note 49 (the DRC has 10% of the
planet's known copper, 30% of its cobalt, and 80% of its coltan used in everything from
Playstations to iPods).
74 See UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2004, supra note 26; UNCTAD, FDI in
LDCs, supra note 39; UNCTAD, RETHINKING FDI, supra note 11.
7 See Behar, Mineral Wealth of the Congo, supra note 49 (reporting that many of the
natural resource investors are essentially rogue investors systematically exploiting the country
and taking whatever they can with impunity).
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of raw materials.7 6 The internal governance difficulties and uncertainties
faced by post-conflict transition countries, such as Angola and the DRC, do
not make them attractive to irreversible, site-specific conventional FDI.
Unlike Angola and the DRC, Liberia plays a dual role in the MNE
system. It has been both a supplier of raw materials and a tax haven for
MNEs. Starting with the notorious Firestone Rubber Plantation at the turn
of the 20th century, Liberia became a major supplier of iron ore to American
and Swedish industries in the 1960s. These MNEs established just enough
railroad transportation links between the mining sites and the port to
facilitate the export of the ore for processing elsewhere. Hardly any internal
linkages were made with the local economy, nor did the operations foster the
developmental goals of the country. Despite the efforts of policymakers,
subsequent timber concessions granted in the 1970s suffered a similar fate.78
Thus, Liberia was and remains largely unattractive to irreversible, high-
value, site-specific, or cheek-by-jowl investments. As a prototypical small
country, the small local market size cannot support the economies of scale
essential for market-seeking FDI.
One of the enduring characteristics of Liberia's international economic
policies has been openness. Throughout its history, in crisis and challenging
economic times, Liberia remained wedded and unwavering in its
commitment to an open economy. 79 An important aspect of this open policy
is a liberal tax jurisdiction which is based on the territoriality or source
76 Id. (arguing that life in the DRC is too precarious, and the general environment is too
chaotic and dangerous for an orderly exploitation of its vast resources, but this might be the
best reason for the measures advocated in this project).
7 See WOLFGANG G. FRIEDMANN & JEAN-PIERRE BEGUIN, JOINT INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
VENTURES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 55 (1971) (providing a full discussion of the LAMCO
joint venture and its impact on Liberia); DAVID N. SMITH & Louis T. WELLS, JR.,
NEGOTIATING THIRD WORLD MINERAL AGREEMENTS 39 (1975) (explaining in Chapter Two
the structure and substance of mineral agreements in Liberia, arguing that the terms were
largely unfavorable and that the financial arrangements of the Liberian-National Iron Ore
Company Agreement of 1958 "were so disadvantageous that the most charitable
interpretation must be that the issue was not clearly understood by Government negotiators");
Stefan Gullander, Joint Ventures and Corporate Strategy, COLUMBIA J. WORLD BUS. 104,
113-14 (1976) (discussing the complex joint venture arrangements involving the exploitation
of Liberia's mineral resources). For an extensive discussion of the history and the different
phases through which mineral, petroleum, and mining agreements moved, see UNCTC, MAIN
FEATURES AND TRENDS IN PETROLEUM AND MINING AGREEMENTS, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/29,
U.N. Sales No. E.83.II.A.9 (1983).
7 Liberian E. Timber Corp. (LETCO) v. Liberia, ICSID Case No. ARB/83/2, Award
(Mar. 31, 1986; rectified May 14, 1986), 26 I.L.M. 647 (1987) (an arbitration concerning the
exploitation of timber under concession agreement).
7 Kojo Yelpaala, The Efficacy of Fiscal Incentives within the Dynamics of the
Multinational Enterprise: The Case of Ghana and Liberia (May, 1985) (unpublished S.J.D.
dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison) (on file with author) [hereinafter Yelpaala,
Dissertation] (an econometric and comparative study of the political economy of a small open
economy with a mixed economy and the responses of FDI to various political and governance
variables); Yelpaala, Model Investment Law, supra note 12, at 25.
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principle. That is, Liberia does not levy any taxes on income earned by
Liberian nationals or corporations outside its territorial borders. Thus,
Liberian subsidiaries of foreign MNEs are only subject to taxation for
income earned within Liberia. In addition to the policy of an open economy,
Liberia is also a "flag of convenience" state which allows the registration of
foreign owned ships in Liberia.
The combined effects of these policies are that Liberia is attractive to
FDI motivated by the benefits conferred by a tax haven. This has wide-
ranging implications for the country if FDI is to play a meaningful role in its
economic development. To the extent that income earned outside Liberia is
not subject to Liberian taxes, there is hardly an incentive for foreign
investors to engage in activities, transformative or otherwise, within the
country that would subject them to taxation. In a perverse way, the tax
haven status of the country discourages the type of high value investments
that would be beneficial to its economic development because, as much as
possible, income generating activities will be engaged out of jurisdiction.
There is an obvious incentive for FDI in the extractive industries to be
primarily scoop and ship operations." Local processing which generates
higher value would also subject a higher amount of operational revenues to
local taxes. It is therefore hardly surprising that since the 1990s, Liberia has
attracted relatively large amounts of "flag of convenience" FDI primarily
from Japan.
Flag of convenience FDI is essentially a tax haven bookkeeping device
that does not involve any actual capital inflow. The value of the ships
registered under this process constitutes the FDI. Such bookkeeping-driven
investments, while very valuable to the MNE, are slippery and easily
switchable between jurisdictions in the bookkeeping process. Moreover,
because the ships are likely to be used in international trade between
countries and points outside Liberia, the income generated in that process
will escape Liberia taxation. 82 Thus, Liberia may be used as an instrument
for sheltering income of other countries from taxation without the positive
capital accumulation effects. The flexibility inherent in the MNE system
makes this not only possible but also easy.
Of course, the political economy of Liberia is a very complex one
which cannot be addressed here. However, if the goal of the liberal tax
jurisdiction regime and the "flag of convenience" policy is to encourage FDI
for the economic development of the country, that goal may be elusive.
Viewed as a regime, these policies would encourage the least amount of
so See generally Gullander, supra note 77.
8 See UNCTAD, FDI in LDCs, supra note 39, at 10; UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT
REPORT 2007, supra note 3.
82 Multinational Gas & Petrochemical Co. v. Multinational Gas & Petrochemical Servs.
Ltd., [1983] 3 W.L.R. 492 (C.A.) (Eng.).
83 See generally Yelpaala, Dissertation, supra note 79.
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operational activities in the country, particularly in the extractive industries
where the country has natural endowments and comparative advantage.
That is, FDI operations would involve mostly the extraction and export of
raw materials which would deny the country beneficial value-added
activities, technology transfer, and essential links with the local economy.
They would also discourage irreversible investments and encourage
transitory FDI with little or no actual capital inflows. In particular, "flag of
convenience" investments in a tax haven such as Liberia are likely to
contribute less to economic development. By their very nature, nothing may
be done or is required to be done in the host country. In a vertically or
horizontally integrated MNE system, significant amounts of income may be
earned by Liberian registered ships without contributing any value to the
local economy except the registration fee. In all of these cases, the
contribution by FDI to the development of Liberia would be minimal unless
some proactive development-driven policies are put in place.
A. Policy Implications for Post-Conflict Transition Countries
The preceding discussion of the MNE FDI system suggests a few
important points that should engage the attention of policymakers concerned
about the contribution FDI can make to their local economic development.
It is obvious that given the functional dynamics of the MNE system, no
country can count on conventional FDI to make the type of contribution it
needs for growth and economic development without some guidance.
However, policymakers must command a thorough but neutral
understanding of the system. By neutrality, we mean that policymakers
should refrain from attributing a deliberate intent of MNEs to impose harm
on the interest of countries. Unless the evidence warrants it, such an
attribution of a harmful intent might detract policymakers from the
fundamentals of sound policy design. Rather, policymakers should focus on
the actual or perceived vulnerabilities of MNEs and the cost and benefits of
the system on their economies.84 In other words, the search for the
contributions of the MNE system to local economies must be a double-sided
search that involves a series of questions.
First, what motivates MNEs in the choice of participating countries in
their systems? Put differently, what is the role of any specific FDI from the
investor's point of view? Why are some countries suppliers of raw materials
and others manufacturers of products? What contributions to the system are
expected from each of the countries and their subsidiaries in the system?
What local conditions in each host country might contribute to the position
of that country in the NNE system? Second, what can FDI investment do
for the transformation of their economies rather than what FDI can do for
the country? In view of the fact that the distribution of the benefits of the
84 See Yelpaala, Cost and Benefits ofFDI, supra note 8, at 97.
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MNE system among the participating countries might be uneven or even
inequitable, which type of FDI operations could positively alter the
distribution of those benefits? Which types of FDI are likely to expose the
host country to negative externalities in the form of social and
environmental costs, or expose the dependence associated with the volatility
of the global economy? Indeed, the risks of detrimental impact associated
with certain investments are too high for policymakers to ignore these
critical and fundamental issues.
In the specific case of post-conflict transition countries, this
understanding is even more crucial because they are likely to face several
additional problems and constraints. The sample of countries examined
here, Angola, the DRC, and Liberia, all fit well into the model of the MNE
system discussed above. All three countries have been long time suppliers
of raw materials. This would seem to suggest that MNEs in those countries
made decisions that minimized certain uncertainties or avoided the
vulnerabilities associated with irreversible, high-value, asset-specific
investments in local processing or manufacturing. Yet, MNEs' demands for
raw materials are such that they made investments even in the midst of
political turmoil and severe insecurity. So, even during its internal conflict,
Angola continued to attract FDI, primarily in the petroleum sector.
Notwithstanding the volatility of its political conditions, Angola remained
one of the leading recipients of FDI in Africa. Moreover, in spite of
governance difficulties, the DRC also attracts investments in the extractive
industry. As discussed above, within the context of the post-conflict chaos
and governance difficulties that seem to exist within the DRC, it is doubtful
how many benefits the country could receive in its position as raw materials
supplier.
VI. TRANSFORMATIVE INDUSTRIAL STRATEGIC POLICY
ARCHITECTURE
The task of this endeavor is of a very limited nature. The goal is to
determine what role FDI might play in the transformation of post-conflict
transition countries. Unfortunately, time constraints and space limitations
prevent this study from fully addressing all of the complex issues of
macroeconomics, industrial policy, and industrial legislation that this topic
deserves. Thus, the following discussion is tailored to explore and develop a
framework or a blueprint that directs the debate away from conventional
FDI as an instrument for growth and development of post-conflict transition
countries.
We will propose a transformative industrial strategic policy architecture
in which non-conventional FDI plays a complementary role as an engine of
development within a carefully crafted domestic investment demand. What
is proposed here is a direct reversal of roles in the creation of MNE FDI
systems in which the host country exercises greater control over the type,
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timing, and duration of FDI. Through screening, targeting, and sequencing,
industrial projects and technologies with the greatest potential for generating
sustained growth and development should be funded through a project
finance and build-operate-and-transfer ("BOT") format. As will be
explained below, project sponsors, as foreign investors, should play an
important but transitory role in responding to the developmental objectives
of the host country for profit. In that context, we shall argue that
conventional, neo-liberal, anti-state market-based prescriptions that
dominated the 1980s and 1990s are perhaps misguided and ill-suited to the
needs of post-conflict transition countries in search of instruments for
development. This is particularly the case when uncompromising market-
based principles are preached and imposed on countries where market
failure of the first order dominates their economies.
A. Contexting the Strategic Policy Architecture of the Post-Conflict State
The picture painted earlier of the post-conflict transition state within
the system of traditional FDI raises serious questions about whether FDI can
play a meaningful transformative role in their economic development. First,
from the perspective of the strategic mindset of MNEs, post-conflict
transition countries play only limited roles in the achievement of their
corporate objectives. Any developmental impact of MNE activities in the
host country is a by-product or consequence, and not necessarily a directed
corporate objective. Second, certain prevailing conditions in post-conflict
transition countries make them attractive only to certain types of
conventional FDI with limited transformative possibilities. We have already
addressed these issues above. However, for emphasis and to clarify the
approach advocated below, the conditions of post-conflict transition
countries need to be summarized.
By various classifications of countries by the United Nations, its organs
and other international institutions, post-conflict transition countries are
some of the poorest countries in the world. Some of them fall into the
category of countries classified as least developed countries, fragile
economies, or landlocked. Some of these countries belong to more than one
of these categories. Several of them are found in Sub Saharan Africa, a
region notorious for consistently lagging behind other developing countries
in basic economic indicators such as GDP growth, per capita income and
general economic performance. Standing alone, most post-conflict
transition countries constitute small markets either because of their
population or because of low per capita income. Such is the case of Liberia
and Sierra Leone. Others, such as the DRC, with larger population and
greater market potential, lack basic infrastructure, transportation, and
telecommunications that can support a successful marketing strategy. In
response to the limitations of small markets and the demands of economies
of scale for production that can support market-seeking manufacturing FDI,
cross-cutting and overlapping regional trade organizations and free trade
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agreements have mushroomed in Africa. For instance, Common Market for
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), of which Rwanda is a member,
has 19 member countries that stretch from South Africa to Egypt. Covering
larger geographic areas with huge populations and diverse economies, one
would have thought that the market size problems faced by manufacturing
FDI would have been removed by the formation of these regional trade
organizations. Unfortunately, the intended regional markets are also
hampered by similar inadequate infrastructural linkages and other barriers to
effective marketing. Thus, the effective markets for FDI continue to be
national markets.
With these conditions and constraints, post-conflict transition countries
appear to be unattractive to high value FDI with the transformative capacity
they need. From the earlier discussion of the enduring characteristics of
FDI, the poorest of poor countries are hardly ever attractive to MNEs in
search of markets and profits unless those countries are endowed with
abundant natural resources.85  Besides, in view of lingering security
questions and the vulnerabilities associated with specific asset investment
inherent in long term, irreversible, and high-value FDI, conventional FDI
has tended to be primarily in the extractive or natural resource industries.
Designed to minimize investor exposure to vulnerabilities, and purely for the
export of raw materials, these types of operations cannot transform the host
country. Instead, they tend to expose the host country to the vagaries and
volatilities of the world commodity markets.
It is clear from this summary and the arguments advanced so far that
left alone, FDI does not often lead to growth and economic development in
post-conflict transition countries. Indeed, it seems that such an expectation
of MNEs would be a mismatch of expectations and responsibilities. The
primary objective of MNEs is not economic development, although they
stand to benefit from it and can contribute to it. On the other hand,
economic development is one of the primary responsibilities of the state, and
it is incumbent on the state to take all necessary measures to achieve its
developmental objectives. For developing countries in general, the evidence
so far seems to suggest that economic development cannot easily be
achieved without some deliberate and active state intervention. The state
cannot relinquish that responsibility to the so-called pure market forces
guided by the invisible hand. Just as a farmer tills the land, plants and
nurtures his crops for a great harvest, so too must the State take measures
for the development of its economy. This is the context in which one must
see the role of post-conflict transition countries in the design of industrial
strategic policy architecture for development.
85 See supra notes 20-37.
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B. Modeling Industrial Strategic Policy Architecture: Lessons from Success
Stories
The argument advanced is not that market principles are not relevant in
designing the fundamental industrial policy. Rather, it is that post-conflict
transition countries, in search of techniques to jump start their economies,
should benefit from the lessons of recent success stories of other countries.
In particular, they should look to the newly industrializing economies
("NIEs") of South East Asia for clues and ideas that could inform their
choice of policies and techniques for laying the framework for development.
The lessons from this region are particularly instructive given that the
countries do not constitute a homogeneous group. In an informative and
careful study of a sample of 119 countries, John Page offered some reasons
for the miraculous success of these countries.86 At the outset, he pointed out
that the East Asian miracles are hardly homogeneous or monolithic in
culture, economic conditions, resources, population, or historical
87
experience. In spite of such diversity, they all shared certain common
characteristics in their success. They all enjoyed simultaneously sustained
growth and equitable distribution of income. That is, they debunked the
view once held that there is an inverse relationship between growth and
equity. Instead they demonstrated that high levels of growth can be
positively correlated to high income equality.8 As these economies enjoyed
unprecedented growth rates, the gap between the rich and poor
simultaneously narrowed significantly. The policy architecture that
produced such miraculous results is worth the attention of other developing
countries, particularly countries in search of a framework for development
after conflict and major economic disruptions. The critical question is-
what policies produced these impressive results?
The answer to this question is particularly important to countries that
have suffered severe and untold devastation, but are looking to make a fresh
start. However, according to Page, there are two schools of thought with
respect to the reasons for the East Asian miracle. One school, the
fundamentalists, hold that these countries relying on market principles got
the basics right. They focused on policies that increased physical and
human capital per worker and allocated resources efficiently. In essence,
they concentrated on getting the "price right." 89 The mystics, on the other
hand, argued that markets have consistently failed to guide investments into
industries with the greatest potential for growth. It was activist governments
in the region that intervened directly in getting the "price wrong" by
channeling investments and technologies into predetermined industries and
projects with the greatest potential for growth which normal market forces
86 Page, supra note 7, at 219.
8 Id at 220.
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would have rejected.90 It would, however, appear that the explanation of the
success of NIEs is too complex to be cast in an either-or choice between the
fundamentalist and mystic arguments.
The overall evidence from Page and numerous other studies suggests
that a combination of fundamentalist and mystic policies played a significant
role in the productivity growth and development of these countries. 91 It
appeared that all countries, at different phases and at different rates,
combined market-oriented capital accumulation and allocation policies with
state interventionist policies that promoted specific industries and
technologies believed to have high value transformative effects. More
specifically, common to all countries were the combinations of the following
policies: (1) market oriented capital accumulation and allocation; (2) state
interventionist policies that promoted specific industries and technologies;
(3) unusual macroeconomic stability spurred by sound policies and
management; (4) improved integrity of the banking systems with carefully
designed and monitored directed credit that increased profitability for the
banks; (5) educational policies that focused on primary and secondary
education which generated a rapid increase in the pool of skilled labor force;
and (6) agricultural policies which did not over-tax rural communities.92
Without diminishing the significance of other complementary policies,
it would appear that rapid human capital growth was perhaps the most
important element in the success of the industrial policies pursued. The
industrial targeting policies and the manufactured-export-orientation based
on new technologies all required a skilled labor force. High productivity
growth, high quality output, and efficiency driven low cost production,
which in turn were also essential for global competitiveness of their exports,
could not have been achieved without a growing pool of skilled labor.
Perhaps one of the most important reasons for the high simultaneous growth
rates and the rapidly narrowing income gap was the emphasis on increased
supply of skilled labor achieved through primary and secondary education.93
Without such resources, achieving the industrial transformation as designed
would have been difficult, if not impossible. However, as skilled labor
productivity increased, so did their wages and other compensation, which
then narrowed the income inequality gap.
C. The Role of the Developmental State
One of the important lessons to be discerned from the success stories of
the East Asian Miracles is the role of the "developmental state" in economic
development.94 The "developmental State" is one that does not approach the
90 Id at 224.
91 See, e.g., Page, supra note 7, at 234; SAKONG, supra note 5; Scitovsky, supra note 5.
92 Page, supra note 7, at 234.
94 UNCTAD, RETHINKING FDI, supra note 11, at 59-60 (arguing that: (1) the ideology of
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development task as a dichotomized tension between the state and markets,
seen by neo-liberal economists and the so-called Washington Consensus
virtually as incompatibles. Nor does it see any bipolarity between market-
driven, export-led growth and an inward-looking or import substitution
development agenda. The development task of these countries does not
easily fit into such simple dichotomies or bipolarities. It is not a simple
choice between free and unfettered markets and "statist" restrictive and
protectionist policies. Nor is it between a domineering or dominant state
control over entrepreneurial decisions and free market structures. Rather, it
calls for marshalling various forces of the political and bureaucratic elites,
entrepreneurs and industry leaders, various economic rent seekers, and other
stakeholders into a symbiotic organism with a single national mission for
industrial development.
The pessimists and skeptics might view the success of these East Asian
Miracles as too much of a cultural phenomenon unique to that region and
therefore of little value to post-conflict transition countries. If so, one might
ask why neo-liberal free market driven policies have transcendent cultural
and universal characteristics. Moreover, as pointed out by Page, the East
Asian Miracles are hardly culturally homogeneous, yet they employed
similar industrial policies with similar remarkable results.95 Certainly,
culture plays some role in how a sound industrial policy might be adapted in
any country, be it Liberia, Bosnia, or Angola. However, the soundness of an
industrial policy emphasizing high-value manufacturing investment is not
culturally driven. Besides, why should any person put a ceiling on what
other people or cultures can do in any country by denying them access to
successful and workable models? Some might even call the approach used
by the successful countries as "state capitalism," in a pejorative use of the
term, suggesting that there is only one road to development and it is the
unfettered free market system. Diversity of development theories and
instruments cannot be a detriment, but rather a major asset unless we
underrate the adaptability of humanity.
The experience of the Asian Miracles suggests that what post-conflict
the developmental State as fundamentally "developmentalist," as its major preoccupation is to
ensure sustained economic growth and development on the back of high rates of
accumulation, industrialization, and structural change; and (2) such a State structurally has (or
develops) the capacity to implement economic policies that effectively deliver development,
which in turn gives it legitimacy); see also Thandika Mkandawire, Thinking about
Developmental States in Africa, 25 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 289-313 (2001); Kojo Yelpaala, The
Impact of Industrial Legislation on the Behavior of Multinational Enterprises and Labor in
the Industrializing Countries of East and South East Asia, 6 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD.
383 (1984) (explaining the use of coherent industrial legislation across sectors and labor and
its impact on foreign investment conduct); see generally Manuel Castells, The Four Asian
Tigers with a Dragon Head, in STATES AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE ASIAN PACIFIC RiM 33
(Richard Appelbaum & Jeffrey Henderson eds., 1992); GUNNAR MYRDAL, ASIAN DRAMA: AN
INQUIRY INTO THE RECOVERY OF NATIONS (1968).
9 Page, supra note 7, at 220.
55
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 30:23 (2010)
transition countries need is an industrial policy design that is outside the
conventional norms but well-suited to their developmental needs. The push
for non-conventional policy design is nothing extraordinary. It conforms
with the earlier call for creativity of the first order if post-conflict transition
countries were to be transformed amidst the significant and extraordinary
circumstances they face. It is also consistent with a growing unease with the
once-dominant-neo-liberal policy prescription of the 1980s and 1990s. A
paradigm shift seems to be in the offing among development economists
about the role of the state in development. Moreover, institutions such as
the World Bank and many development economists seem to recognize the
limitations of the neo-liberal economic policy prescription for developing
countries. 9 6  The neo-liberal anti-state, market-oriented approach to
development policy has not borne fruit in many poor countries, and not from
the lack of effort.97  As Easterly might describe it, the diagnosis and
medicine of the "Planners" have not worked.98 The task of poor developing
countries, and particularly those emerging from years of conflict, cannot be
left solely to preconceived market forces. The task requires the hand of an
activist "developmental state" that must harness and weld together a
multiplicity of forces into a symbiotic organism with a single national
economic development mission.
96 See, e.g., EASTERLY, supra note 54; JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION
WORK (2006); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002) [hereinafter
STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS].
97 The need for and impact of neo-liberal structural adjustments for countries that
experienced serious economic malaise have been a subject of much debate in various circles,
including the Economic Commission for Africa. For a discussion, review, and the results of
the structural adjustments programs, see Ikubolajeh Bernard Logan & Kidane Mengisteab,
IMF- World Bank Adjustment and Structural Transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa, 69
ECON. GEOGRAPHY 1 (1993). After several years, the IMF and the World Bank are not exactly
celebrating the success of the structural adjustment policies. In its 2005 publication, the
World Bank discussed the issues of global development finance, managing vulnerability and
the failures of FDI and the severe challenges to eradicating poverty. See WORLD BANK, supra
note 4; STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS, supra note 96, at 18 (Stiglitz, a
Nobel Prize winner in Economics in 2001, Chairman of President Clinton's Council of
Economic Advisors and Chief Economist for the World Bank, providing a very critical inside
view of the World Bank and the IMF and concluding that the structural adjustment program
failed to bring sustained economic growth even to those countries that adhered strictly to the
program); EASTERLY, supra note 54, at 68 (pointing out after repeated doses of shock therapy,
otherwise known as structural adjustment loans under austere conditions, the economic
performance of the recipient countries did not improve).
9 EASTERLY, supra note 54, at 6-7.
9 Several examples exist on how the Asian Miracles combined various policy instruments
for success. The lesson from their stories is not that one should copy them, but rather the
need for a melange of various policy instruments from education to demographics to labor.
See generally Paul Morris, Asia's Four Little Tigers: A Comparison of the Role of Education
in their Development, 32 COMP. EDUC. 95 (1996); Frederic C. Deyo, Labor and Development
in East Asia, 505 ANNALS Am. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 152 (1989); Eva Mueller, The Impact
ofDemographic Factors on Economic Development in Taiwan, 3 POPULATION & DEV. REV. I
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D. The Developmental Post-Conflict State
It is apparent from our discussion so far that the needs of post-conflict
transition countries for transforming their economies into sustainable growth
and development point to the choice of adopting the role of the
"developmental state."',00  First, post-conflict transition countries are
afflicted with several severe market failures and constraints on their
economies that cannot easily be resolved by reliance on pure neo-liberal,
anti-state, and market-driven policies. They need a pragmatic,
developmental "activist" or "interventionist" state with the right industrial
policy framework."o' Second, it is also clear that conventional FDI and its
system of interconnected operations as currently configured is unlikely to be
a meaningful instrument for economic development in these countries. Most
of them are suppliers of raw materials within the MNE system which does
not create any beneficial links with the local economy. Notwithstanding
these facts, MNEs have the capital, technology, know-how, and other
resources essential for economic development. These resources can be
harnessed and channeled to that end by the State. Third, the evidence from
countries that have made a meaningful and sustained transition towards
industrialization suggests models and pathways to development that can
inform the choices to be made by post-conflict transition countries. The
success stories have demonstrated that the "developmental state" can,
through ingenuity, craft a complex and deliberate commingled policy design
that relies substantially on domestic investment demand and local physical
and human capital accumulation for the manufacture of products aimed at
external markets.
(1977).
100 UNCTAD, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: RECLAIMING POLICY SPACE at 58,
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ALDC/AFRICA/2007/1, U.N. Sales No. E.07.II.D.12 (2007)
[hereinafter UNCTAD, RECLAIMING POLICY SPACE].
101 See Dani Rodrik, Getting Interventions Right: How South Korea and Taiwan Grew
Rich, ECON. POL'Y, Apr. 1995, at 55 (arguing that the growth in South Korea and Taiwan was
a result of subsidized and coordinated investment decisions and government policy
engineered to increase private capital); Yung Chul Park, Development Lessons from Asia:
The Role of Government in South Korea and Taiwan, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 118 (1990) (arguing
that the governments in both South Korea and Taiwan played an active role in the export-led
growth of their economies); Samuel P. S. Ho, Economics, Economic Bureaucracy, and
Taiwan's Economic Development, 60 PAC. AFF. 226 (1987) (examining the complexities of
the institutional, political, and administrative interrelationships in development and the
successful role of the economic bureaucracy in the development of Taiwan); Kevin Grice &
David Drakakis-Smith, The Role of the State in Shaping Development: Two Decades of
Growth in Singapore, 10 TRANSACTIONS OF THE INST. OF THE BRITISH GEOGRAPHERS 347
(1985) (discussing how the social and economic development of Singapore has been carefully
shaped by the state to ensure national prosperity); see also SOUTH ASIA IN THE WORLD:
PROBLEM SOLVING PERSPECTIVES ON SECURITY, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, AND GOOD
GOVERNANCE (Ramesh Thakur & Oddny Wiggen eds., 2004) (a collection of several
conference papers covering a wide range of topics ranging from security to development
policy for the region).
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The task of the "developmental state" is to focus on the answer to the
critical question: what is the meaning and purpose of development?
According to Amartya Sen, winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics in
.1998, ancient religious and philosophical texts have struggled with the
purpose of wealth. 2 According to Sen, Aristotle saw wealth merely as an
instrument for something else. 0 Similarly, the industrial policy architecture
of the "developmental state" might be aimed at a chain of purposes: the
empowerment of the economy, which in turn empowers people towards self-
fulfillment and liberty. Thus, industrial policy is ultimately not about
growth indices, but about economic, social, and cultural enrichment of
individual citizens for the expression of their liberty. Indeed, for all its
brilliance, Hernando De Soto's celebrated book, The Mystery of Capital,
deals with unlocking the vast amounts of the invisible capital the poor has at
its core, the purpose of which is enlightening the poor to transform their vast
unstructured wealth towards self-realization. 04
In view of the foregoing, the goal of this section is to develop, or at
least to suggest, an industrial strategic architecture for a developmental state
that benefits from the positive elements of successful countries while taking
into account the conditions of the post-conflict transition countries. Such a
strategic architecture will draw on the positive contributions of foreign
investors outside the framework of conventional FDI. It will seek the
contributions of capital, technology, know-how, and other resources
generally generated and bundled in FDI while avoiding the attributes of
permanent ownership and control of conventional FDI as well as their cost.
As a general policy, the industrial strategic architecture contemplated will
insist on investment activities that create meaningful links with the local
economies. This will require, as its primary focus, the elimination of the
export of raw materials without some local processing. Put more directly, as
a general policy, post-conflict transition countries with abundant natural
resources must resolve never to export those resources in their raw form.
Such a policy will be perhaps the single most important policy decision
made. It will establish a major paradigm shift via the acquisition of a
mindset that demonstrates the belief and willingness of the country to alter
its position permanently in the global commodities regime. It will at once
constitute an immediate break with the past and compel the adoption of
several policies essential to local value-added and economic development in
general. The feasibility, sequencing, and intensity of the required productive
activities will be a matter of policy, based on the nature of the resources in
102 AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT As FREEDOM 13 (1999).
103 Id. at 14.
10 See generally HERNANDO DE SoTo, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM
TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILs EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000) (explaining that capitalism has
not worked in poor countries not because of the lack of capital, but the invisible and
unstructured way in which capital exists that makes it impossible to harness its greatest
potential for development).
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each country.
The strategic policy architecture must take into account the mineral and
natural resources of the country. However, the industrial policy prescription
for transforming post-conflict transition countries must go beyond the
processing of raw materials and reducing the vulnerabilities associated with
them. The strategic architecture must include policies directed at upgrading
various sectors of the industry, with a view to value-added investment
activities. According to John Dunning, a country should improve upon any
processes it does well, in addition to venturing into other sectors that hold
promise for industrial upgrading. 05 In particular, consideration might be
given to investments in what has been described as flexible factories for the
manufacture of standardized products or manufacture-to-order operations for
spare parts, clothing, and similar operations in services. 06 The current wave
of outsourcing globally captures this phenomenon. An independent factory
not committed to the continuous process of the manufacture and sale of a
specific product has great flexibility and a great opportunity for sharing its
fixed costs with its customers. 0 7
However, a manufactured-export-led industrial strategy necessarily
demands the achievement of a second goal in the design of industrial
policy-the recognition of the important and inevitable links between trade
policies, investment policies, and export-led growth and development.'0o
The evidence from the Asian Tigers demonstrates clearly that a successful
export-oriented industrial policy had to address three crucial elements: (1)
the demand side of the equation, that is, which products to manufacture and
for which markets; (2) the essential elements of global competitiveness for
those products (high quality, low cost, and low price); and (3) the issue of
market access. Policymakers understood that globally competitive products
needed a free trade regime that assured market access to target markets.109
The achievement of these goals was a collective effort of government
officials in the relevant ministries, trade negotiators, and entrepreneurs
(particularly industry leaders). For instance, working within the framework
of the gaps and ambiguities in GATT and employing tactical
"bilateral/unilateral" voluntary export restraints, Japan was able to gain and
105 Dunning, supra note 9, at 32-33.
106 See John W. Kensinger & John D. Martin, Project Finance: Raising Money the Old-
Fashioned Way, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Fall 1988, at 69; see generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN,
THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2005).
107 See Yelpaala, Global Product Distribution, supra note 68, at 888 n. 163.
1os See, e.g., Manuel R. Agosin & Francisco J. Prieto, Trade and Foreign Direct
Investment Policies: Pieces of a New Strategic Approach to Development?, TRANSNATIONAL
CORPS., Aug. 1993 (Volume 2), at 63, 68-70 (advocating linkages between trade and foreign
investment policies for increased effectiveness in promoting development); Terry Ursacki &
Ilan Vertinsky, Long-Term Changes in Korea's International Trade and Investment, 67 PAC.
AFF. 385 (1994); SAKONG, supra note 5; Kwack, supra note 5; Scitovsky, supra note 5.
109 See, e.g., SAKONG, supra note 5; Kwack, supra note 5; Scitovsky, supra note 5.
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retain market access to some high per-capita income markets such as the
United States for its high demand export products in the 1970s and 1980s.no
The third goal of the industrial strategic architecture for the
developmental state is self-reliance. Ultimately, the transformation of the
economies of post-conflict transition countries must be in the hands of locals
who are most familiar with their needs and the complexities of welding
together competing forces into a coherent whole for the national good.
Foreign planners, advisors, and other well-wishers can assist but cannot do it
for them. From Japan to South Korea and more recently, from India to
China, the evidence is mounting that the development task is
"homegrown."' It requires the building of foundational institutions and
adopting fundamentally sound macroeconomic policies. The concept of
self-reliance might seem counterintuitive in the case of countries that are just
emerging from severe conflict, but the experience of Vietnam and Rwanda
might contradict that. With the right framework and mindset, much is
achievable, even in post-conflict states.
Fourth, and more specifically, it is clear from our discussion of the
success stories that the economic fate of post-conflict transition countries
cannot be left totally in the hands of the free-market forces under the type of
neo-liberal policies that dominated the 1980s and 1990s. Nor can the
transformation of these countries be purely the function of the
interventionist and activist state. In the post-conflict transition state, either
of these approaches in isolation will be an unmitigated disaster. The
severity of market failure and the potentiality of excessive political power
that normally befalls post-conflict countries do not bode well for an either-or
policy framework. What is required is the "developmental state" that
designs its industrial policy drawing from a combination of sources. Under
its guiding hand, private investments play the primary role in investment
10 Andreas Lowenfeld has provided an interesting discussion of the evolution of
"voluntary restraints agreements" dating back to the late 1960s when the U.S. Congress
initiated a series of bills (at least 22) aimed at imposing quotas and limits on the importation
of foreign steel products into the United States. To forestall such legislation, which is often
difficult to repeal, Mr. Yoshihiro Inayama, the Chairman of the Japan Iron and Steel
Exporters' Association, went to Washington D.C. for talks with the U.S. Department of State
and proposed import restraints to be imposed by the Japanese exporters. For a full discussion
of that history and the legal issues that followed see ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, PUBLIC
CONTROLS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE 195-252 (2d ed. 1983); and Detlef G. Lehnardt,
Comment, Executive Authority and Antitrust Considerations in "Voluntary" Limits on Steel
Imports, 118 U. Pa. L. REv. 105 (1969). The issue of using voluntary restraints by Japanese
industries later came to a head in the semiconductor industry, resulting in the Semiconductor
Accord of 1986. See Dorinda G. Dallmeyer, The United States-Japan Semiconductor Accord
of 1986: The Shortcomings of High-Tech Protectionism, 13 MD J. INT'L L. & TRADE 179
(1989); Diane P. Wood, "Unfair" Trade Injury: A Competition-Based Approach, 41 STAN. L.
REv. 1153 (1989) (arguing that there is no reason for consumers to be deprived of low-priced
products through the use of trade restraints).
11 EASTERLY, supra note 54, at 6.
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activities targeted towards certain industries and manufactured exports with
the greatest potential for development, while the government simultaneously
engages in infrastructure development and appropriate regulation of
industry.
Finally, it is clear from our discussion so far that the "developmental
state" should not allow unfettered or unregulated access to its productive
resources with the greatest potential for generating growth and development.
This restrictive approach was taken by the East Asian Miracles towards FDI.
Through different policies and regulations, South Korea and Taiwan
channeled FDI towards industries where their contribution would advance
some national objectives. In certain industries, foreign investors were
permitted only as equal or minority joint venture partners with local
enterprises.l12 In the case of Japan, there appeared to be a preference for the
acquisition of foreign technology instead of FDI. The most recent example
of the "developmental state" at work is China.113 It is fair to say that the
foreign investment laws of China do not encourage unfettered or
unregulated FDI in all industries.114 The foreign investment laws distinguish
between the more desirable high technology investments and others for
differential treatment. 15
It is apparent from this discussion that the policy response to FDI was
not hostility but one geared towards harnessing its positive effects and
contributions to the local economies. Where FDI could make a difference, it
was not left to its own devices to make the needed contribution. Rather,
foreign investors were prodded, guided, or channeled towards certain
industries or projects. If this was the context within which FDI operated
beneficially under much more favorable circumstances, the question
presented here is whether FDI could produce similar beneficial
consequences under less hospitable circumstances and without guidance in
post-conflict transition countries. The answer to this question will be
pursued below.
VII. THE ROLE OF PROJECT FINANCE IN INDUSTRIAL POLICY
IMPLEMENTATION
The argument advanced so far is that conventional FDI is an unlikely
candidate for a strategic industrial policy architecture geared towards
transforming the economy of a post-conflict transition country. Burdened
by severe economic constraints and endemic uncertainties compounded by
112 Urban C. Lehner, Breakup of Dow Chemical's Joint Venture with Koreans Leaves
Both Sides Unhappy, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 1983, at 44.
113 See generally UNCTAD, RECLAIMING POLICY SPACE, supra note 100.
114 See Yelpaala, Model Investment Law, supra note 12, at 45; Yabo Lin, New Forms and
Organizational Structures of Foreign Investment in China Under the Company Law of the
PRC, 7 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 327 (1994).
115 Lin, supra note 114, at 333-38, 343.
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ever-looming risks, post-conflict transition countries are hardly attractive to
the type of high value FDI that could transform a country. The foreign
investment opportunities that tend to attract MNEs to those countries are
mostly in enclave and natural resource activities with minimal
developmental impact. Enclave investments in abundant natural resource
countries might even infect them with the so-called "Dutch Disease."' 1 6 Yet
in the midst of this disappointing picture, the opportunities for high value
transformative foreign investment abound only if a different type of investor
and investment opportunity is sought after. The investment instrument that
holds great promise for transforming these countries is project finance or a
variation of it, generally referred to as build-operate-and-transfer ("BOT").
The self-reliance industrial policy framework advocated in this study could
benefit from project finance projects that result in an eventual transfer of the
projects to local interests. Although BOTs are generally analyzed under the
framework of project finance, we examine them separately for the purposes
of emphasis and clarity in policy implementation.
A. Project Finance
Project finance is a tried-and-true, old-fashioned, medieval merchant
banking investment practice that seems to have escaped the attention of
foreign investment theorists. As an investment instrument, project finance is
a non-recourse or limited-recourse financing scheme used by private
investors to fund specific projects or ventures solely on the basis of the
ability of the projects to pay for themselves from their cash flow.' The
sponsor of the project does not guarantee repayment of the principal and
interest should the project fail to produce sufficient proceeds to service the
debt. In that sense, the financing is non-recourse funding in which the
lenders, creditors, and equity investors do not look to the general assets of
the sponsor for repayment of the loan. In the case of limited-recourse
financing, the lenders look to the assets of the sponsors for a repayment of a
portion of the debt.' 18 As is generally the case, most interesting investment
11 Kremers, supra note 50, at 96-136 (discussing the term "Dutch Disease" in explaining
the internal economic stresses the Dutch economy experienced in the 1960s and 1970s as a
result of the development of its natural gas reserves); ECA, supra note 50, at 22-25, 37
(discussing the Dutch Disease problems within the mineral regimes of Africa).
117 See generally BENJAMIN C. ESTY, MODERN PROJECT FINANCE (2004) (examining the
economic analysis and case studies of project finance); ScoTT L. HOFFMAN, THE LAW AND
BUSINESS OF INTERNATIONAL PROJECT FINANCE (2001) (providing a discussion of a wide
range of issues relating to project finance transactions); Kensinger & Martin, supra note 106;
Harold F. Moore & Evelyn D. Giaccio, International Project Finance, 11 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 597 (1986); Roger S. McCormick, Legal Issues in Project Finance, I J. ENERGY &
NAT. RESOURCES L. 21 (1983).
11 See generally CHARLES HARVEY, ANALYSIS OF PROJECT FINANCE IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES (1983) (an analysis and comparison of different types of loans, their cost and
effective interest rates).
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schemes with great potential for profitability are unlikely to be totally new
in the history of business. It is therefore not surprising that project finance
has ancient roots. In an insightful article, John Kensinger and John Martin
traced the origins of non-recourse project finance to medieval Florentine
merchant banking practices.1 19 Apparently, as early as 1299, the English
Crown raised funds from Frescobaldi, a leading Florentine merchant bank,
based on a contract of repayment solely from the output of the Devon silver
mines.2
This ancient venture-by-venture financing technique remained
prominent throughout the days of trading expeditions and voyages until the
emergence of the joint-stock companies of the 17th century. In fact, it
would appear that daring voyages of explorations chartered by European
princes and undertaken by Vasco da Gama and Bartholomew Diaz along the
west coast of Africa to the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa were of that
character. Indeed, the Dutch East India Company and its counterpart the
British East India Company relied on this venture-by-venture method of
funding trading expeditions and voyages in their early days. 12 1 At the end of
each voyage, the accounts were settled and investors were paid. This gave
investors the freedom either to roll-over their investments or to participate in
new ventures purely on the basis of their promise for reasonable returns on
capital. Even with the advantages of permanent capital associated with the
rise of the modern limited liability company, some investors have continued
to prefer the flexibilities inherent in project-by-project investment
instruments. They do not want their capital locked up permanently in the
hands of corporate managers. This is good news for creative policymakers
seeking transformative capital investments.
It is therefore not surprising that Kensinger and Martin have pointed
out that non-recourse project finance did not disappear even with the
emergence of the modem corporation. 12 2 Indeed, project finance has not
only made a remarkable comeback in modern times but also seems to hold
significant implications for the future of funding projects, particularly in
risky poor countries. After all, the trading expeditions and voyages financed
by investors were risky ventures to say the least. Project finance is now
employed by both developed and developing countries in a variety of
projects including infrastructure, power generation, oil and gas and mineral
explorations and exploitation, orbiting communication satellites,
119 See Kensinger & Martin, supra note 106, at 69.
120 Id. at 72; JEAN GIMPEL, THE MEDIEVAL MACHINE: THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION OF THE
MIDDLE AGES 73-74 (1976) (in a chapter devoted to mining the mineral wealth of Europe, the
author explains that one of reasons the Frescobaldi, Florentine financiers, were willing to
advance the English Crown money in return for the revenue from the silver mine leased to
them was that cash flow from the mines doubled).
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manufacturing, and research and development. 123  However, the modern
proliferation of project finance seems to be a phenomenon concentrated
mostly in developed countries, Asia and Latin America. 124 Naturally, the
return of project finance has also produced a growing body of literature
addressing its various complexities as an investment instrument which
cannot be explored here.125
However, what potential non-recourse project finance holds for the
future should be of great importance to post-conflict transition countries
seeking investment for risky but transformative ventures. Conventional
FDI, with its emphasis on permanent capital and its commitment to
continuous processes of manufacturing specific product lines marketed
under a unified brand name, may not always be ideal for projects in
developing countries that do not fit into that framework.126 For developing
countries in general, and post-conflict transition countries in particular, the
non-recourse model of funding projects can be tailored to their development
objectives more effectively.
One may ask why project finance provides opportunities for the
transformation of post-conflict transition countries. We shall endeavor to
investigate this question by focusing on the nature and structure of a typical
project finance transaction as captured in Diagram 2 below. 127
123 Id. at 70; see PRISCILLA ANITA AHMED, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION,
LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE No. 7: PROJECT FINANCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 18 (1999)
(providing a distribution of project finance by sector).
124 AHMED, supra note 123, at 3; see generally LARRY H. P. LANG, PROJECT FINANCE IN
ASIA (1998) (providing a study and analysis of project finance and its adaptive configurations
in "New Asia").
125 See, e.g., L. M. Farrell, Financial Engineering in Project Management, 33 PROJECT
MGMT. J. 27 (2002); Teresa A. John & Kose John, Optimality ofProject Finance: Theory and
Empirical Implications in Finance and Accounting, 1 REV. QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT. 51
(1991); John W. Kensinger & John D. Martin, Project Finance for Research and
Development, 8 RES. IN FIN. 119 (1990); Samir El-Gazar, Steven Lilien & Victor Pastena, The
Use of Off-Balance Sheet Financing to Circumvent Financial Covenant Restrictions, 4 J.
AcCT. AUDITING & FIN. 217 (1989); Salman Shah & Anjan V. Thakor, Optimal Capital
Structure and Project Financing, 42 J. ECON. THEORY 209 (1987); James C. T. Mao, Project
Finance: Funding the Future, FIN. EXECUTIVE, Aug. 1982, at 23 (1982).
126 Kensinger & Martin, supra note 106, at 80.
127 ESTY, supra note 117, at 28.
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Souce: Benjamin C. Esty, Modem Project Finance, 28 (2004)(Diagram has been modified).
As is apparent in Diagram 2, the typical project finance transaction will
involve at least six primary parties and the project company through which
the assets of the project are managed in a separate and independent legal
entity. Critical to any project finance transaction are the sponsors who
undertake to raise the necessary capital for the project from banks and other
lenders. Depending on the nature of the risk in the project, the sponsor may
be required to make equity contribution in the range of 15% to 30% of total
cost.1 Thus, instead of conventional FDI, the project is funded by a
substantial amount of debt and small equity investment. In this diagram, the
sponsors will make the equity contribution through an equity joint venture.
The non-recourse debt is made by a syndicate of banks and multilateral and
bilateral institutions. However, given that the project concept is derived
from and driven by government industrial policy emphasizing local
processing, the host government is an indispensable party to the transaction.
The three other parties include input suppliers to the project company,
output purchasers who buy the products through various contractual
128 See LANG, supra note 124, at 11; HOFFMAN, supra note 117, at 5.
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arrangements, and the contractor responsible for building the plant.
In our earlier discussion of the MNE system, we argued that the rise of
the MNE was in part to address the failure of the law of contracts in open
market transactions and to minimize the transaction costs associated with the
misalignment of contractual obligations. An internal MNE contracting
system operating within a vertical and horizontal integration structure is
maintained by fiat, thereby eliminating the open market contract problems.
In the case of project finance, the entire structure is constructed and
maintained largely by relying heavily on the open market model. Indeed,
modem project finance is a nexus of complex interconnected contractual
relations between host governments, sponsors, bankers, suppliers of inputs,
and purchasers of outputs. The success of a project finance venture and the
eventual repayment of the debt depend on how well the series of
interconnected contractual obligations assign and minimize the risks and
costs associated with the misalignments in the contracts. Given the non-
recourse or limited-recourse nature of the financing involved, the
materialization of certain significant risks would jeopardize cash flow and
repayment obligations. Although the project might have been generated or
directed by government industrial policy, its implementation is not the
responsibility of the government but is driven and guided by open market
forces. This leaves the success of the project in the hands of private
entrepreneurs who have serious stake in it.
Thus, in its modern reconfiguration of non-recourse or limited-recourse
form, project finance offers several advantages for economic development.
The fact that funding is based on a project-by-project basis lends itself to the
implementation of an industrial policy based on targeting industries and
projects with the greatest potential for economic development. With the
government on the sidelines, the private parties with limited-recourse, non-
recourse or equity capital exposure in the project have every reason to work
for its success. Concerns expressed in the 1970s over the cost and benefits
of FDI led to arguments for a dynamic screening process for FDI with the
best potential for development at the least cost. Nearly three decades
later, the issues of cost and benefits of FDI have reemerged, and screening
for the most developmentally sound projects through a strategic industrial
policy architecture continues to be relevant. With target industries and
projects identified, the governments can undertake feasibility studies or
solicit them from potential sponsors.130 Qualifying projects have certain
attractiveness to both the sponsor and the government. Because the projects
129 See Yelpaala, Cost and Benefits ofFDI, supra note 8.
130 Adora Navarro, Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Arrangements: The Experience and
Policy Challenges 14-17 (Phil. Inst. for Dev. Studies, Discussion Paper Series No. 2005-01,
2005), available at
http://unpanl.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/EROPA/UNPANO29875.pdf
(discussing the bidding process for BOT projects under the Philippines BOT legislation).
66
Rethinking the FDI Process and Incentives
30:23 (2010)
are selected on the basis of their potential contribution to the industrial
policy objectives of the host country, there is little risk that there will be no
positive developmental impact on the country. From the sponsors' and
lenders' point of view, the fact that the projects must pay for themselves
makes them less financially risky. Thus, project finance presents
opportunities for win-win investment relationships which otherwise would
not exist.
B. Impact of Project Finance on Industrial Policy Objectives
From its inception to its current modem configurations, project finance
has continued to offer several benefits to foreign investors and host
governments that permanent capital in the form of FDI does not easily
provide. The benefits and advantages examined below should also draw the
attention of policymakers in post-conflict transition countries.
From the equity investors' point of view, project finance provides
sponsors with financial independence on a project-by-project basis and
insulates their general assets from the financial obligations associated with
the loan for the project. This is often referred to as "off-balance-sheet" debt
because the project finance debt does not show up in the consolidated
financial statements of the sponsor. 1 This permits the sponsor to maintain
a certain debt/equity ratio and to avoid diluting its existing equity.132 Even
when the project finance is on a limited-recourse basis, the commitments of
the sponsor are still substantially less than full recourse obligations. For
host governments, risky and complex ventures with developmental potential
can be funded and implemented.
The cost of the typical complex project finance transaction runs from
the tens of millions to billions of dollars. For example, while the cost of the
Nghe An Tate & Lyle Sugar Mill in Vietnam was $90 million, the cost of
the Australian-Japan Cable project stood at $520 million, and that of the
Chad-Cameroon Pipe Line was $4 billion.133  The financial demands of
these projects expose lenders to such high risks that no single lender is
willing to undertake them alone. The funding of projects is therefore
generally undertaken by multiple parties: banks, equity investors, and
multilateral institutions to spread the risks associated with each project.134
Risk distribution works to the benefit of host developing countries because it
allows more deserving projects to be funded at a lower cost to the
participants and governments.135 Moreover, the parties can participate in
multiple projects without risking huge amounts of capital. Conventional
131 HOFFMAN, supra note 117, at 9.
132 Id. at 10.
133 EsTY, supra note 117, at 71, 93, 190 (providing case studies of different projects and
their related costs).




International Law & Business 30:23 (2010)
FDI, even within its risk-sharing joint venture format, is unlikely to commit
such huge amounts of permanent equity to these ventures in risky countries.
Moreover, the demands of project finance are fairly rigorous. As an
International Finance Corporation (IFC) report aptly stated, there is no free
lunch in project finance.' 3  Because each project must stand on its own and
pay for itself, the selection process is guided by careful capital budgeting
techniques. Qualifying projects must then meet basic corporate capital
budgeting requirements in terms of their cash flow and the ability to pay for
themselves. Although objections might be raised about the government
picking winners, one ought to keep in mind that this process compels the
host government to pick wisely and therefore brings some discipline in any
policy of industrial targeting used by the government.
For countries with abundant natural resources, manufacturing-based
project finance confronts directly the enclave characteristics of conventional
FDI lamented by the World Bank and other international institutions.137 If,
as we have argued, no resources may be exported without local processing,
project finance provides several advantages in that regard. Establishing a
local processing plant would bring about the infusion of capital, technology
and know-how-the very assets and contributions generally sought after in
conventional FDI. With project finance, the host country receives those
resources and benefits in the industries and projects that matter to its
industrial development goals, the achievement of which is not guaranteed by
conventional FDI. Moreover, local processing not only provides value-
added contribution to local resources but also creates linkages with the local
economy generally considered essential for development. Besides,
conventional FDI in natural resources may create a perverse effect on
supplier countries. It may expose them to vulnerability created by the
volatility of global commodity markets on which they have to rely.
The growth rates and economic fortunes of mono-crop economies or
those heavily dependent on one or two commodities traded in the world
commodities markets are dictated by forces outside their control. Their
growth rates rise and fall with the swings in world commodity prices. Such
is the current experience of many African countries that seem to be enjoying
high GDP growth rates mainly because of current favorable commodity
prices.138 However, with local processing, the growth rates of post-conflict
transition countries will be stabilized over time. Consider what the
136 Id.; see also LANG, supra note 124, at 68.
137 WORLD BANK, supra note 4, at 97 (arguing that FDI in natural resources creates limited
linkage effects, produces the Dutch Disease, and makes host countries susceptible to the
volatility of world commodity prices).
138 See INT'L MONETARY FUND, REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 4
(Oct. 2007), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2007/AFR/ENG/sreol007.pdf (arguing that fragile
economies such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the DRC are enjoying higher growth rates
because of higher commodity prices).
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economic fates of Angola and the DRC would be if these countries sought to
compel or at least insist on local processing of their raw materials. The
crude oil of Angola would be refined before export, as would the numerous
ores and minerals of the DRC. Producers of coffee beans such as Rwanda
would, through project finance, establish flexible coffee roasting facilities
with the capacity to roast coffee beans to the specifications of any foreign
buyer. Over time, countries such as Rwanda, Ethiopia and Kenya could
develop their own national brands of roasted coffee for the global market
place.
The point that ought to be stressed here is the need to redirect national
policy towards new empowering possibilities for developing countries. The
limitations on local processing in poor countries may be more an issue of
limited imagination and generalizations than one of limited human capacity
in specific cases. For instance, in 1998, Mozambique, one of the least
developed countries in the world, with the assistance of ILFC, obtained
project finance funding of $1.2 billion for a green field investment in an
aluminum smelter called MOZAL.13 9 This project was the largest private
sector project in the country. Kaiser Aluminum has operated an aluminum
processing plant since the 1960s in Ghana using imported bauxite and
initially imported technical labor.140 Neither of these countries could be said
to have had the requisite supply of labor at the outset. The feasibility of
local processing was assessed against the backdrop of the global supply of
human capital and other resources in the short term and the necessary long
term adjustments.
Notwithstanding the arguments made in the immediately preceding
section, the labor policies in an industrial policy framework for local
processing ought to be addressed separately. Local processing ultimately
will require skilled local labor in the form of engineers and technicians if the
benefits of know-how transfer are to be realized. In the typical post-conflict
transition country, such skilled labor may be absent either because of
inappropriate educational programs or brain drain. Both of these problems
can be addressed in the short and long term. Initially, the productivity of the
local processing plant can be handled by hiring foreign skilled labor. The
world offers an almost inexhaustible pool of skilled labor for the needs of
any specific project in any country. However, the future needs of the
processing plant must be addressed through a deliberate training program,
the cost of which is incorporated in the cost of the project. In other words,
built into the project cost must be the training of a pool of local engineers
and skilled labor to replace the foreign technical work force in the long run.
The sponsor must undertake to implement this program with yearly targets
for an agreed upon number of years so that at the end of that period, the size
of the technical labor necessary for efficient operations would have been
139 AHMED, supra note 123, at 2.
140 See HART, supra note 69, at 59-64.
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substantially satisfied.
What is perhaps even more important to the policy requiring local
processing is its impact on other government policies. This single policy
should trigger complementary policy changes in education, banking,
investments, commercial laws, public expenditures on infrastructure,
macroeconomic management, and other areas essential to the industrial
development goals pursued.14' Thus, to ensure the continuous flow of
technical labor force, the general educational policies of the country will
have to be adjusted and realigned. As discussed above, the East Asian
Miracles heavily focused on primary and secondary education not only toincrease labor productivity but also to close the income inequality gap.14
One of the benefits of local processing of raw materials for exports is
the irrelevance of the constraints imposed by small, underdeveloped or
inaccessible local markets. The target markets for the output are external,
hard-currency global markets which are infinitely larger than the supply
capacity of any single small country. The existence of these markets should
not be in question because they are the same markets that foreign raw
materials processing plants aim to serve. The real issue will be the global
competitiveness of the output with respect to quality, cost, and price. But
under project finance, the project would most likely not be funded if these
requirements were not met. A well-constructed link between trade,
investment, and industrial policy should ensure market access. 14 At least,
the policy of local processing of raw materials for export compels a
comprehensive, coherent, and integrated policy framework that ties all the
pieces together. There are neither half measures nor free lunches in the
development game.
C. Industrial Upgrading of Light Manufacturing Industries and Other
Sectors
The emphasis on local processing of raw materials for export should
not be read as a limited policy prescription. Rather, it is to stress the need
for a paradigm shift in the policy orientation of developing countries in
general and post-conflict transition countries in particular. After all, the
possibilities for industrial upgrading even in countries with abundant natural
resources extend beyond those resources. Moreover, several countries are
not endowed with abundant natural resources. The general argument we
seek to make is that industrial policy should be aimed at empowering the
141 A comprehensive approach to industrial policy complemented by industrial legislation
appears to be the approach used by the East Asian Miracles. See SAKONG, supra note 5;
Yelpaala, Model Investment Law, supra note 12, at 44-46 (discussing the nature of industrial
legislation within the framework of industrial policy).
142 Page, supra note 7, at 227-29, 234, 264.
143 See generally Agosin & Prieto, supra note 108 (discussing the important link between
trade, foreign direct investment, and development).
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local productive forces through value-added industrial upgrading investment
activities in sectors with the greatest promise for growth and development.
Such empowerment may focus on exploiting the comparative advantage of
the country together with whatever opportunities the global economic
resources may offer.
Project finance can be employed fruitfully in establishing
manufacturing facilities for the production of generic or standardized global
products such as spare parts, component parts, original equipment
manufactured products, bottles, and soda cans that can be used by many soft
drinks manufacturers. In the high-technology sector, data processing and
related computer based service centers offer yet other opportunities for
servicing multiple clients within the current global outsourcing regime.
Factories with multiple output capacities have been aptly described as
flexible, independent, or batch-process in that the manufacturer neither owns
the products nor produces a single line of products tied to a brand name or
logo. 144 The use of project finance under these circumstances provides the
manufacturer with great flexibility in managing its risks and maintaining
stable profits. Flexible factories are capable of producing different types of
unbranded or branded products for different foreign customers. Such is the
case of manufacture-to-order facilities that produce different brand name
designer clothing or customized goods or components for different
customers. The manufacturer is not unlike the typical village blacksmith of
yesteryear who made different wares and products on order for different
customers.145
For post-conflict transition countries, the batch-process manufacturing
plant offers several advantages for industrial upgrading. As already pointed
out above, the manufacture of goods destined for foreign customers and
markets minimizes or removes the domestic and regional market constraints
faced by these countries. As an independent manufacturer of different
products under contract for different customers, the manufacturer retains
great flexibility for profitable operations. The cash flow of the manufacturer
that is so essential for project finance is not linked to a single product or
market of the manufacturer but is determined by a variety of its
manufactured products marketed by its customers globally. The
manufacturer is to a large extent insulated from the consequences of
competition between its customers for global market share. Losses and
gains in market share by its customers may result in a loss of some
customers, but they do not necessarily change its production volume and the
resulting cash flow.146
Project finance of flexible factories or production services opens up
other possibilities for a host country in the area of strategic alliances. One of
144 Kensinger & Martin, supra note 106, at 81.
145 id
1461 d. at 74.
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the goals of the strategic alliances of the 1980s was to search for
opportunities to convert fixed costs into variable costs by sharing them with
as many partners as possible. Flexible manufacturing facilities fit into this
mold. Through them, many competitors save money by not building their
own plants and investing money in the manufacturer but by sharing their
fixed costs with contractual arrangements. These arrangements permit
economies of scale, lower per-unit-cost, and better global price
competitiveness.
The impact of project finance on independent value-added
manufacturing facilities would produce effects similar to those gained from
the processing of local raw materials. The investment would involve the
transfer of capital, technology, and know-how and would create linkages
with the local economies. Of course, the efficacy of this policy would
depend critically on the availability of skilled labor, productivity of labor,
output quality and cost. The response to these issues has already been
discussed above. Similarly, the efficacy of independent, export-oriented
factories would depend on well-coordinated investment and trade policies
also discussed above.
In conclusion, the search for transformative policies and investment
strategies in post-conflict transition countries must start not only with what
the domestic economy offers but with what the global economic
environment offers in terms of capital, technology, other resources, and
markets. In the short term, the picture may be dim, but policymakers should
focus on laying the foundations for sustained future growth and
development. With project finance, some of the short term and long term
constraints can be addressed by utilizing available global resources to
empower local industries to be self-reliant in the long term.
VIII. THE USE OF BUILD OPERATE TRANSFER INDUSTRIAL
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
One of the key elements to the strategic industrial policy architecture
advocated for post-conflict transition countries is the use of self-reliant
economic development policies. We have argued that outsiders, no matter
how well-intentioned, ultimately cannot transform those economies. 147 They
neither have much at stake nor are they in the best position to assess the
complexities of the local conditions and make the most critical choices
necessary. The locals are better suited for that job and can carry that out
effectively if given the proper support. We have argued that such support
can be given within the framework of project finance funding of private
sector projects that hold the greatest promise for growth and development.
As part of that empowerment, we now argue that the project finance model
should be build-operate-and-transfer ("BOT") in which projects are
147 EASTERLY, supra note 54, at 26-33.
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transferred to local owners after a specified term.
The term BOT is said to have been the brain child of Turgut Ozal,
Prime Minister of Turkey, who coined the term in 1984 during the
privatization of Turkish public projects.14 8 Soon after its introduction, the
concept caught the imagination of governments in Europe, Asia, and
elsewhere that were seeking funding for various infrastructural projects at a
time of severe fiscal constraints. The BOT approach became an attractive
instrument for funding infrastructural projects such as power generation
plants, toll roads and tunnels, such as the Eurotunnel. 14 9 For policymakers,
it made sense to invite foreign capital for the construction and management
of basic infrastructural projects and have them transferred to the host
government after the projects had paid for themselves. The attractiveness of
the eventual transfer of an efficient and effective operating facility to local
owners is one of the reasons why the BOT model is advocated here for the
private sector in post-conflict transition countries.
Under the BOT approach, one or more private sector sponsors are
authorized to create a private project company to build a manufacturing
plant or other facility using the project finance system to raise the necessary
capital for the project. Under an agreement, the sponsors will build,
manage, operate and maintain the facility through the project company as a
separate and distinct legal entity for a specified time period after which the
plant is transferred to local owners. The duration of time given to the
sponsors to manage and operate the plant will vary with the size of the debt,
the risks associated with the venture, and its projected cash flow. 5 o BOT
projects vary in characteristics, sectoral conditions, risks, and costs. With
non-recourse or limited-recourse lending based on the notion that each
project must pay for itself, the duration of the contract for the transfer to
local ownership must reflect the risks and conditions of each project. In
other words, the duration must reflect how long it would take for each
project to pay for itself and provide the equity investors with a reasonable
return. The BOT technique has short and long term policy elements. In the
short term it can be used to jumpstart an industry, and in the long term, to
develop successful local entrepreneurial skills.
148 Mark Augenblick & B. Scott Custer, The Build, Operate, and Transfer ("BOT')
Approach to Infrastructure Projects in Developing Countries 2 (World Bank, Working Paper
No. 498, 1990). The BOT concept has several variations to the theme. For instance some may
come as "BOOT" (build, own, operate and transfer), "BOO" (build, own and operate), "BRT"
(build, rent and transfer), "BOOST" (build, own, operate, subsidize and transfer), and "BTO"
(build, transfer and operate). See Paul Handley, A Critical View of the Build-Operate-
Transfer Privatisation Process in Asia, 19 ASIAN J. PUB. ADMIN. 203, 213 (1997).
149 See Handley, supra note 148, at 212; LANG, supra note 124, at 153; see generally
ESTY, supra note 117 (discussing various case studies of infrastructural power plants and
other projects including the Eurotunnel).
Iso Handley, supra note 148, at 212-13 (explaining the duration of BOT projects: power
generation, 10-20 years; toll roads, 20-30 years; and the Eurotunnel, 55 years).
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Just as project finance has ancient roots, the underlining conceptual
framework of BOTs is also traceable to the 18th century French-
concessionized infrastructural project financing scheme used to develop the
French water system.1 5' Thus, the BOT approach shares the same attributes
and characteristics with the typical project finance analyzed above.
However, the BOT model shares essential characteristics with production
sharing agreements and service contracts that emerged in the 1960s in the oil
and gas industry.15 2 Under these agreements, foreign enterprises acting as
independent contractors provided debt capital to host governments for the
exploration and exploitation of oil and gas which was paid for in cash or in
kind according to a set of complex contractual provisions. Similarly, as part
of the project finance schemes, BOTs constitute a series of complex
transactions and contractual relations involving multiple parties, different
resources, several phases and risks.
The purpose of this study is not to explore all the complexities of BOT
transactions and operations. Rather, our goal is to focus on the issues that
are relevant to the use of BOTs as instruments of empowering local
entrepreneurs for economic development. Attractive as the BOT concept
might be for developing local entrepreneurs, it presents certain challenges
for policymakers and governments. The BOT structure, parties, contracting
framework and risks are so complex that success demands the utmost
attention to how all the pieces fit together. The complexities inherent in the
BOT framework are best captured by Diagram 3 below.
151 Id. at 212; see also PRIVATIZED INFRASTRUCTURE: THE BOT APPROACH 1-11 (Charles
T. Walker & Adrian J. Smith eds., 1995).
152 See SMITH & WELLS, supra note 77 (explaining in chapter two the structure and
substance of mineral agreements including the production sharing and service contracts). For
a comprehensive discussion of the history and the different phases through which mineral,
petroleum, and mining agreements moved, see generally UNCTC, supra note 77 (explaining
the different techniques including renegotiations used to redistribute gains for trade and
maintain stability). For an interesting discussion of the structure and renegotiation of
production sharing agreements in Indonesia, see generally Tengku N. Machmud, The
Production Sharing Contract in Indonesia, in INTERNATIONAL OIL AND GAS INVESTMENT:
MOVING EASTWARD? 113 (Thomas W. Walde & George K. Ndi eds., 1994) (describing the
phases of the Indonesian production sharing agreements and the reasons for renegotiations).
New forms of production sharing agreements seem to have adjustments built into them. See
generally Andrei Yakovlev, Production Sharing Agreements in the Russian Petroleum
Sector, 20 WORLD COMPETITION: L. & EcON. REv. 45 (1996) (describing the nature and
structure of production sharing under the Russian production sharing legislation).
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DIAGRAM 3
In our earlier discussion of project finance, we captured its basic
structure in Diagram 2. Diagram 3 draws on that basic structure of project
finance and provides a much more detailed depiction of the parties and the
series of contractual relations involved. However, our discussion of
Diagram 3 shall focus only on issues that are relevant to the role of BOTs in
industrial policy implementation. For the purposes of this study, the
following subjects will be addressed briefly: (1) the nature of a BOT project;
(2) the parties; (3) the central role of the law of contracts; (4) the risks; and
(5) the role of incentives for achieving the development objectives.
A. The Nature of the BOT Project
Implicit in the BOT structure captured in Diagram 3 is the relevance of
the project itself to the developmental objectives of the host country. As
discussed above, not every project is suitable for project finance generally or
under the BOT model. To ensure the developmental impact and
empowerment of local entrepreneurs, projects should be screened against the
industrial strategic policy architecture. In this regard, projects may be
identified by the host country before or after performing feasibility studies to
determine their viability. Having selected the industries with the greatest
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to submit BOT project proposals that meet its goals and objectives.
BOT projects selected under this scheme should satisfy three essential
criteria. First, they must be financially viable in that they generate cash flow
sufficient to service the debt. Second, they must advance some economic
development goals of the host country. Third, each project must have the
capacity for creating a sustainable local entrepreneurial class in the industry
involved. The central theme of these arguments and the policy prescriptions
suggested is that the impact of BOTs on the local economy cannot be left
completely to chance.
B. The Parties
It is apparent from Diagram 3 that the typical BOT project involves a
large number of direct parties and many more associated with different
aspects of the project. The large number of parties presents certain strengths
and weaknesses in BOTs. In the first place, given the non-recourse and
limited-recourse nature of funding involved, BOT projects are likely to
receive greater scrutiny by different lenders and equity investors concerned
about the risk of loss. As such, qualified projects would have a greater
probability of success. For the host country, the greater the number of
participants, the greater the likelihood of getting the project funded because
the risks will be shared by many as opposed to a single foreign investor.153
Risk sharing also benefits the participants because each of them will
absorb only a small share of the financial and other burdens of the project.
Lower levels of financial exposure and risks allow lenders, sponsors, and
others to participate in multiple projects simultaneously. Operating
collectively also provides the parties with collective security against
potential post-contractual opportunism, threats of expropriation,
nationalization, or measures having equivalent effects.154 Such manipulative
or coercive measures that affect the interests of a syndicate of banks and
other lenders, suppliers, and equity investors in different industries from
different countries and international financial institutions would lead to
significant, if not irreversible, detriment to the international interests of the
host country. The cost to the host country would be too high for it to engage
in any of these post-contractual measures.
Corruption continues to be a major problem in many countries, and
post-conflict transition countries may be even more susceptible to that
phenomenon than others. However, the great number of participants in BOT
projects might create a buffer to corruption by compelling greater
transparency. The theory of cartels suggests that numbers are antithetical to
153 AHMED, supra note 123, at 8.
154 Robert L. K. Tiong, BOT projects: Risks and Securities, 8 CONSTRUCTION MGMT. &
ECON. 315, 326 (1990).
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cartel formation.155 That is, the greater the number of members, the greater
the difficulty of forming and maintaining a cartel. The same can be said of
BOT project participation. Corruption will be difficult to carry out when so
many parties have so much at stake in the project. It would be difficult to
pay off all or some government officials quietly for individual gains. The
legal risks, costs, and reputational damage associated with corruption under
these circumstances might discourage the practice by the participants.
Notwithstanding these advantages, the multiplicity of parties presents
some difficulties in the implementation of BOT projects. One of the key
elements to BOT transactions is the identification, assessment, and
distribution of risks among the parties. The greater the number of parties,
the more difficult it is to distribute the risks. Sponsors and others involved
in these complex transactions might be able to conceal risks which in turn
would increase agency or monitoring cost and the incidence of moral
hazard.156  Moreover, the complexities of the transactions and the legal
regime essential for their success might over-task the legal capacity of the
host country, particularly in the post-conflict context. Thus, an essential
element for the success of BOTs in post-conflict transition countries would
be legal reform that would facilitate the transactions consistent with their
industrial policies.
C. The BOT Contract
Central to the BOT transaction is the role of the law of contracts as an
instrument for welding together different independent groups with different
interests into a coherent system of contracts toward the common goal of a
successful venture. An industrial strategic policy architecture that assigns a
significant role to BOTs in its implementation must develop the appropriate
legal environment for the enforcement of contractual obligations. A better
understanding of the nature of the BOT contractual relations would be
essential if the appropriate response is to be made. Although the BOT is
mostly an open markets process, it shares several characteristics with its
counterpart, the firm. In his seminal paper, The Nature of the Firm,
published in 1937, Coase argued that the reason the firm emerged as an
organization was to internalize all those transactions for which its owners
1ss See Katherine Maddox McElroy & John J. Siegfried, The Economics of Antitrust
Enforcement, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST LAW 139-40 (Terry Calvani & John
Siegfried eds., 2d ed. 1988) (arguing that the fewer the number of firms in an industry, the
simpler it would be for the firms to coordinate their actions and to agree upon common
goals). Cartel theory argues that the incentives to cheat on one's cartel partners increase as
the number of firms increase, and the stability of cartels decreases as is the case of corruption.
As the number of partners increase, it will be difficult to collude quietly to corrupt
government officials. Id
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could not rely on the open markets and to minimize transaction cost.'5 7 Put
differently, the firm was a response to market uncertainties and
misalignments in open market contractual relations managed by the firm
through integration. Having removed the necessity of dealing with
independent third parties, internalization and integration permitted the
owners to manage the internal relationships by fiat. 8 This is seldom the
case for post-conflict transition countries. However, modem commentators
argue that the firm is a nexus of contracts.159 In their view, the firm creates
its own internal organization based on a nexus of contracts between the
owners, managers, employees, suppliers, customers and others in an attempt
to avoid certain costly external market transactions. As explained above, the
internal dynamics of the nexus of contracts of the firm are governed by
authority and fiat under a management command system. The firm sought
to replace costly open market contracts with a system of internal contracts.
In many respects the BOT transaction seems to mimic the firm by
relying on a nexus of contractual relations aimed at creating a system that
minimizes risks, reduces costs, and receives the benefits of internalization
without the cost of its authority structure or management by fiat. The
preference for markets suggests a preference for party autonomy and a
contract management system based on mutuality of interests. Thus, the
BOT approach would flourish within matured and stable contractual
regimes. To the extent that the BOT approach is a policy choice, the market
preference elements should be reinforced by reforming the legal framework
in contracts for better results.
However, just as the firm suffers from agency cost, so does the BOT
transaction. 16 0 In the modern firm with widely diffused ownership, the
separation of ownership and control imposes a monitoring cost on owners
concerned about managers pursuing interests other than those of the
owners. 16 1 According to Michael Jensen, one can identify three types of
agency cost in the context of the firm. 16 2 In spite of incentives for proper
conduct by managers, the owners must incur the cost of monitoring aberrant
behavior of managers. As agents, managers also incur what is termed a
"bonding cost" in trying to give guarantees of performance.' 6 ' The third
agency cost has to do with the residual welfare loss occasioned by agents'
157 See Coase, supra note 56.
158 See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 59, at 78, 85; WILLIAMSON,
MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 59, at 106.
15 See MICHAEL C. JENSEN, FOUNDATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY 135-39 (1998)
(arguing that the firm is nexus of contracts written and unwritten among disparate
individuals).
160 See generally Farrell, supra note 156.
161 See James S. Ang et al., Agency Cost and Ownership Structure, 55 J. FIN. 81, 83
(2000); see generally Farrell, supra note 156.
162 JENSEN, supra note 159, at 53-55.
163 Id.
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decisions that do not maximize the interest of the owners.'M If these are the
agency costs associated with organizations managed by fiat, the potential
agency costs are significantly higher in complex multiparty transactions,
such as BOTs, organized purely on the basis of contractual relations. Each
party and each transaction within the project brings its own category of risks
that must be identified, assigned and monitored. The associated agency
costs cannot be underestimated.
The relationship between the bankers and the project company is purely
one between a creditor and a debtor, which nevertheless has agency cost
implications. Creditors have to incur monitoring costs to ensure that
repayment commitments are valid and honored. Guarantees, commitments,
and undertakings by the host government to sponsors, lenders, and other
equity investors face similar agency costs. Policymakers' appreciation of
the nature and sources of these agency costs should result in appropriate
policy measures and incentives targeted at addressing the agency costs and
should facilitate the function and the eventual transfer of the project to local
interests.
BOT transactions also share many characteristics with other long term
complex contractual relations such as joint ventures, licensing agreements,
and strategic alliances. 16 5 All of these transactions are notoriously burdened
by incomplete contracts because of bounded rationality and opportunism.
While bounded rationality addresses the computational incapacity of the
human brain, opportunism deals with human motivations behind
transactions.166 Parties to a contract may seek to take advantage of others
through the non-disclosure of relevant facts, half-truths, and even outright
falsehoods or by skirting obligations ex post. The complexity and the
multiparty nature of BOT transactions expose them to the same level of
obligatory and contingent incompleteness as other long term contracts.
164 Id at 54.
165 See Kathryn Rudie Harrigan, Joint Ventures and Global Strategies, COLUMBIA J.
WORLD Bus., Spring 1984, at 7 (offering a dynamic explanation of corporate joint ventures);
Gullander, supra note 77, at 111-14 (describing joint venture strategies for complex
transactions). For strategic alliances, a few examples of the vast literature will suffice. See
generally YADONG Luo, ENTRY AND COOPERATIVE STRATEGIES IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
EXPANSION (1999) (providing the theoretical and strategic basis for international cooperative
arrangements ranging from joint ventures to strategic alliances); ALAN S. GUTTERMAN, THE
LAW OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC ALLIANCES: A SURVEY FOR CORPORATE
MANAGEMENT (1995) (discussing a wide range of complex strategic alliance agreements);
Ranjay Gulati, Alliances and Networks, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 293 (1998) (discussing
alliances as social networks with dynamic structures, functioning styles, and evolving
governance structures); Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Collaborative Advantage: The Art of
Alliances, HARv. Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1994 (explaining business strategic alliances as living
systems, constantly evolving and requiring careful partner management techniques).
166 See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 59, at 45-50; WILLIAMSON,
MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 59, at 45.
167 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal
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Perhaps even more important in the BOT context is the risk of post-
contractual opportunism. Under the BOT model advocated here, each
transaction would involve the making of irreversible specific asset
investments in the form of plant, equipment and technology, which cannot
easily be redeployed. Oliver Williamson has explored the vulnerabilities
associated with such investments.168  Once a refinery or manufacturing
facility is built, it cannot easily be relocated or converted to other uses.
Moreover, the salvage value of the assets could hardly satisfy the cost of
building them. Other BOT projects such as toll roads or tunnels suffer from
similar vulnerabilities.
Given that the financing of BOTs is non-recourse or, more likely,
limited-recourse, the lenders, sponsors, and all other equity investors are
exposed to ex post contractual opportunism by the host government. In the
unstable regimes of post-conflict states such as the DRC, Liberia, or Angola,
subsequent changes in policy or laws may compromise the cash flow of the
project and the availability of hard currency to service debt or to import
necessary inputs. Such measures would undermine the financial viability of
the project and its ultimate developmental objectives. In response to these
risks, the host government may be required to provide contract stabilization
measures and other guarantees such that changes in policy and law would
not alter the commitments, obligations and repayment terms of the BOT
project. In appropriate cases, sinking funds against revenue shortfalls may
be recommended. Contract stabilization provisions in natural resource
extraction and similar development agreements are not always desirable.
There might be a greater justification for these provisions in BOTs that fit
into the industrial policy architecture recommended in this study.
The cursory examination of the contracting environment of BOTs
suggests that a country that embarks on the BOT approach must
simultaneously address all the fundamental policy issues relevant for the
enforcement of contracts. An essential element of an effective BOT system
is stability in expectations, which can be provided through a BOT legislation
that provides a clear and stable regulatory framework for BOT
transactions.16 9 Such legislation would lay out the process, the criteria for
participation, the process for project initiation, the bidding procedures, and
Choice ofLegal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992) (discussing contingently and obligationally
incomplete contracts); Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of
Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in
Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory ofDefault Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
168 See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 59, at 52 (explaining the nature
of, and vulnerabilities associated with, specific asset investments).
169 See An Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act No. 6957, Entitled "An Act
Authorizing the Financing, Construction, Operation and Maintenance of Infrastructure
Projects by the Private Sector and for Other Purposes," Rep. Act No. 7718 (1994) (Phil.),
available at http://www.gppb.gov.ph/lawsrules/laws/RA 7718.pdf. For a discussion of this
law, see generally Navarro, supra note 130.
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the general rights and obligations of the parties. Equally important for
providing stability of expectations is dispute resolution. The complexity of
economic development agreements and their inherent political ramifications
make them better suited for alternative dispute resolution than litigation. It
would therefore be necessary for the BOT legislation to provide for the
resolution of BOT disputes by conciliation, mediation, or arbitration under
any international arbitration procedures. However, while a country may opt
to be a signatory to the various international conventions for the settlement
of investment disputes such as International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID), the need for settling such disputes by
arbitration does not necessarily mandate subscribing to such treaties.
Mandating arbitration in the BOT legislation should be sufficient as long as
the parties are given the freedom to choose the arbitration institution or
procedure. However, an effective arbitration mandate may require
subscription to the New York Convention on the Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards ("Convention").o70  For post-conflict transition countries,
this subscription gives additional confidence to lenders and other investors
contemplating participation in BOT projects. Among the post-conflict
transition countries, Liberia, Bosnia, and Mozambique, but not Angola, the
DRC, and Rwanda, are signatories to this Convention. 171
IX. MANAGING BOT PROJECT RISKS
Critical to the success of any BOT project is the identification,
evaluation and allocation of the project risks. Each project type carries
with it certain characteristic risks that must be addressed. Infrastructural and
industrial projects are not only dissimilar in their characteristics but also in
their associated risk factors. The allocation of the different categories of
BOT risks has been the subject of some intellectual investigation
elsewhere. 173 Consistent with the mission of this study, an in depth analysis
of how these risks are identified, assessed and distributed is beyond the
scope of this work. Our interest is limited to investigating how BOT risks
170 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (New York Convention). For a discussion of the
Convention, see generally Kojo Yelpaala, Restraining the Unruly Horse: The Use of Public
Policy in Arbitration, Interstate and International Conflict of Laws in Calfornia, 2
TRANSNAT'L LAW. 379, 457-62 (1989); Paolo Contini, International Commercial
Arbitration: The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement ofForeign
ArbitralAwards, 8 AM. J. COMP. L. 283 (1959).
171 U. N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law [UNCITRAL], Status: 1958-Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/1958NYConvention.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2009). Bosnia
signed the Convention on September 1, 1993; Liberia on September 16, 2006; and
Mozambique on June 11, 1998. Id.
172 See Tiong, supra note 154, at 319-27.
173 See infra Part IX.B.
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might be addressed within the context of industrial policy to facilitate the
management of such risks. Recall that the industrial strategic policy
architecture is aimed at the local processing of raw materials, value-added
industrial upgrading, manufactured exports, technology transfer, and
creating linkages with the local economy. In this regard, one may ask what
project risks might undermine these objectives and how these risks might be
managed for the industrial policy to succeed.
As a general matter, BOT risks might be described or identified by the
type of project, the phases of the project, or the type of risk. To some, each
project has pre-implementation, implementation, construction, operating,
and transfer risks. 4 To others, the risks might be viewed as startup,
operating, technology, market, and political risks.
Irrespective of the classification of these risks, the basic principle in
risk allocation is that risk should be distributed based on its source and
parties' ability to manage it. So, the question of great relevance is, which
risks are traceable to the host government, and which risks can the host
government more easily and effectively manage.
Because the focus of this study is primarily on BOT projects for
transforming post-conflict transition countries, the discussion that follows
will address only those risks factors that the host government must manage
to ensure success of its BOT policy objectives. In focusing on this limited
set of risk factors, we are nevertheless aware of the variety of other risk
elements in BOTs that has generally been the subject of discussion. The
following risks will be examined briefly below: (1) risk of government
disinterest; (2) political risks; (3) foreign currency and input risks; (4)
infrastructural risks; (5) force majeure risks; and (6) transfer risks.
A. Risk of Government Disinterest
Once an industrial project has gone through its feasibility and approval
phases and lending and investment commitments have been secured, the
host government may simply move on to the next project. However,
construction may be stalled for various reasons including shortages, cost
overruns, and other events. The entire project may even collapse at that
stage. For lenders, equity investors, and others with different types of
financial exposures, such an event would be financially disastrous. The cash
flow from the project is essential for the loan repayment, and some
reasonable returns on investment are contingent on a completed and
operational project. None of this would come to pass if the project fails at
its construction phase. It is therefore generally argued that the success of
project finance projects depends on some level of host government
174 See generally Tiong, supra note 154.
1 See Farrell, supra note 156, at 549-50.
176 See generally Tiong, supra note 154.
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involvement.
There are different ways in which the host government's interest in the
success of the project can be sustained beyond approving it and hoping for
its success. This can be achieved by government's participation in the
project company as an equity investor. As indicated in Diagram 2 above,
the government participates in the project company as an equity joint
venture partner with the sponsors directly or as one of the sponsors under the
shareholders agreement. With an equity investment in the project, the
government is unlikely to walk away and remain aloof from the fate and
fortunes of the projects. In the alternative, or even in combination with its
equity participation, the government may offer certain guarantees and
commitments to make funds available should some unforeseen events
threaten the completion of the construction phase of the project.
1. Dedicated Post-Conflict Finance Fund
One of the constraints post-conflict transition countries face is financial
resources and inadequate access to international money markets, where they
could raise capital for these projects at a reasonable cost. One may
legitimately ask how the host government can make these financial
contributions. The answer may lie in having access to a Dedicated Project
Finance Fund ("Fund") earmarked for the transformation of post-conflict
transition countries. Every year, the G8 makes promises of increasing
foreign development assistance aid to poor countries. Many other developed
countries offer various forms of development assistance to developing
countries. In his book, The End of Poverty, Jeffery Sachs has advanced a
passionate case for as much development assistance aid as one could
possible make.177 He argues that foreign aid that raises the per capita stock
from $900 to $1,800 over several years will help countries break through the
poverty trap. 17 8  However, several studies have argued that decades of
foreign development aid programs have failed as instruments of economic
development.1  One must then question not the passion or the compassion,
177 See generally JEFFREY D. SACHS, THE END OF POVERTY: ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES FOR
OUR TIME (2005) (providing a passionate analysis of the root causes of poverty and offering
several solutions, sometimes referred to as the "Big Push," but perhaps better seen as a
minimalist approach on how it might be ended).
178 Id. at 250 (assigning a dominant role to donor aid; without donor funding he argues the
necessary investment simply cannot be financed and poor people will remain in a poverty
trap).
179 See EASTERLY, supra note 54, at 38-40, 50 (arguing that aid, even within the right
policy environment, does not work; the evidence shows that the poorest countries can grow
without foreign aid); see also Raghuram G. Rajan & Arvind Subramanian, Aid and Growth:
What Does the Cross-Country Evidence Really Show?, 90 REV. EcoN. & STATS. 643 (2008)
(showing that after adjusting for possible bias, aid does not have an effect, positive or
negative, on growth in developing countries with sound economic policies); William Easterly
et al., Aid, Policies, & Growth: Comment, 94 AM. ECON. REv. 774 (2004) (finding that aid
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but the wisdom of a policy prescription most people believe is faulty and
ineffective. Sachs' mission in The End of Poverty is to end poverty through
mostly donor aid, which is vastly different from empowering private
entrepreneurial risk taking in targeted industries with the greatest potential
for development impact. The former has minimalist elements, and the latter
is rather boldly self-reliant. Thus, in the case of post-conflict transition
countries, a much more fruitful approach might be to redirect some of the
development assistance funds to a special fund to support the economic
transformation of these countries through project finance and other private
enterprise driven programs.
One of the benefits of such a fund is that access to it can be designed
not as handouts to governments but rather be aimed at projects that have
been approved under the rigorous project finance requirements. In this
sense, the funds would not go to the government but to projects that are
capable of achieving the development objectives through private investment
activities. So much criticism is often leveled at the corruption that comes
with foreign development aid. We may wonder whether this direct approach
to supporting private risks taking in development driven projects would not
only reduce corruption, but also actually lead to successful development
driven projects. However, the government may borrow from the Fund to
make equity contribution to the project company. The government may also
borrow from the Fund to guarantee against cost overruns or shortfalls in
revenue and similar risks. In this sense, the Fund does not go directly to the
government nor is there a free lunch. The Fund may also be accessed by
local sponsors involved in the project to whom the project will ultimately be
transferred after it has paid for itself. As such, the Fund, once established,
would have the capacity to replenish itself over time from successful
projects through the loans repaid either by the government or by local
sponsors. Finally, because each project will be substantially financed by
non-recourse or limited-recourse debt, access to the Fund is less likely to be
abused if certain restrictive criteria were to be imposed to address the
potential for abuse.
B. Political Risks
One of the most significant risks in BOT projects in developing
countries is political risk. Political risks cover a wide spectrum of politically
motivated events and government policies ranging from labor unrests,
government fiscal and economic policies, and outright expropriation and
nationalization.180  These events may undermine the construction or
does not improve growth in poor countries with sound policies); see generally DAMBISA
Movo, DEAD AID: WHY AID IS NOT WORKING AND How THERE is ANOTHER WAY FOR AFRICA
(2009) (the most recent attack on the post-war development aid arguing that it is not
working).
Iso See Tiong, supra note 154, at 325; Farrell, supra note 156, at 550; HOFFMAN, supra
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operational efficiency of BOT projects. In the context of post-conflict
transition countries, the ever-present security risks tend to magnify these
countries' actual or perceived political risks. In most circumstances, the
source of BOT political risks tends to be the host government. In any event,
because of the nature of these risks, the host government is generally better
positioned to manage them. The focus of any political risks management
strategy should be shifting the cost of these risks to the host government by
employing techniques similar to those used in the basic turnkey or
production sharing/service contract models.
With the project funded substantially by debt and some equity, the
private parties face specific asset investment vulnerabilities should they hold
direct or collateralized property rights in the assets of the project company.
Any government measures that compromise the cash flow or the viability of
the project would visit significant losses on the private parties. Because the
goal is to transfer the project to local interests, the materialization of
political risks could precipitate that transfer in a fire sale to the detriment of
lenders, equity investors, and other creditor stakeholders. Moreover, it
would be no consolation to the creditors that such measures may destroy the
creditworthiness of the country and its investment climate.
However, a combination of ex ante political risks management
techniques could be used to shift substantially the specific asset
vulnerabilities to the host government. Under the production sharing and
service contract model, the government and the future private interest
holders have the ownership interest in the project, as in the case of the basic
turnkey agreement.' 8 ' The sponsors, as service providers, may operate the
note 117, at 40 (devoting several pages to a discussion of various types of politically
motivated risks that might arise in project finance); see also Danielle Mazzini, Stable
International Contracts in Emerging Markets: An Endangered Species?, 15 B.U. INT'L L.J.
343 (1997) (discussing the problems encountered by the notorious Enron Corporation in the
State of Maharashtra in India with respect to its power plant and the unilateral termination of
the contract by the government); Wendy B. Woody & Heydar Pourian, Risk Assessment and
Options in Project Finance, 23 PROJECT MGMT. J. 21, 25 (1992) (pointing out the range of
political risks, including outright hostility to the project); see generally Frank C. Shaw,
Reconciling Two Legal Cultures in Privatization and Large-Scale Capital Projects in Latin
America, 30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 147 (1999); S. Baker et al., Techniques for the Analysis
of Risks in Major Projects, 49 J. OPERATIONAL RES. Soc'Y 567 (1998) (providing a general
methodology for assessing risks which could then be managed); James E. Smith & Robert F.
Nau, Valuing Risky Projects: Option Pricing and Decision Analysis, 41 MGMT. Sci. 795
(1995) (discussing and comparing at the theory level options in pricing risky projects); Carl
R. Beidleman et al., Using Project Finance to Help Manage Project Risks, 22 PROJECT
MGMT. J. 33 (1991) (providing a general description of various types of risks that can be
managed through project finance).
181 For turnkey contracts, see generally UNCTC, FEATURES AND ISSUES IN TURNKEY
CONTRACTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, A TECHNICAL PAPER, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/28, U.N.
Sales No. E.83.II.A.13 (1983). For production sharing and service contracts, see generally
Ernest E. Smith, From Concessions to Service Contracts, 27 TULSA L.J. 493 (1992)
(discussing the evolution of mineral contracts towards production sharing and service
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project under a lease or concession granted by the government for a period
of time sufficient to service the debt and give investors a reasonable return
on their capital. Such arrangements may include various forms of subsidiary
contracts such as technical assistance agreements to ensure that the
technology of the project is upgraded as often as needed. The key point here
is that the government cannot expropriate what it owns. It may, however,
interfere with the lease or the activities of the project company and
additional measures may be required. An agreement to indemnify the lessee
and all creditors for the full amount of the outstanding debt and equity,
taking into account a reasonable return on equity laced with a cross-default
clause, could serve as a significant deterrent to breach.182 To ensure that
guarantees of indemnity are not empty promises, the government may be
required to carry political risk insurance covering the value of project as
security. However, the creditors and equity investors may also carry
political risk insurance with any of the many political risk insurance
programs such as Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). Ultimately, the
insurers will have the right to recover any payout from the host
governments, thereby once again shifting the risk of loss to the host
government. Finally, to encourage lenders and equity investors to
participate in the economic development objectives of developing countries,
the private parties should be allowed to recover all political-risks-induced-
losses from the Fund at the cost to the host government. In other words, the
Fund would charge the payout amount to the host government as debt to be
paid to the Fund.
These political risk shifting techniques may appear harsh, but we
should not lose sight of the goals and objectives of the host governments.
The basic strategy of relying substantially on non-recourse or limited-
recourse lenders and some equity investors to create industrial enterprises
with developmental impact imposes significant risks on the lenders and
investors. It is not asking too much to insist that political risk management
techniques be employed to eliminate post-contractual opportunism by the
government, nor should the government expect a handout from the private
parties willing to take some risks to advance their development goals.
contracts that give governments greater say and take in the proceeds); SMITH & WELLS, supra
note 77; UNCTC, supra note 77; and Machmud, supra note 152.
182 Cross-default clauses are a staple in syndicated loan agreements because they are
generally worded broadly enough to work as a deterrent to breach. The typical cross-default
clause is broadly worded to cover defaults on any indebtedness in the event of which the
indebtedness is accelerated or capable of being accelerated. Indebtedness covers all financial
obligations to other creditors. See PHILIP WOOD, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
FINANCE 256 (1980) (chapter 11 devoted to the loan syndication and its implications); Keith
Clark & Andrew Taylor, Events of Default in Eurocurrency Loan Agreements, INT'L FIN L.
REv., Oct. 1982, at 12, 13.
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C. Foreign Currency and Inputs Risks
One of the most significant risks of any type in project finance
transactions is foreign currency risk.'8 3 In addition to the complexity of the
contractual relations among the multiplicity of parties and funding sources
are the currency requirements for debt service. While the project funding
and debt service obligations might be in hard currency, the revenue
generation might be in local currency that must be converted into the
appropriate currency to meet those obligations.184  Moreover, the BOT
project may require foreign currency for the importation of equipments, raw
materials, or other inputs for effective operations. In this regard, BOT
projects face several foreign exchange risks including inflation, the
unavailability of foreign currency, restrictions on transfers, exchange
controls, and currency devaluation. The currency risks could extend to the
restrictive allocation of hard currency necessary for the importation of
materials and inputs for the BOT manufacturing facility. There are various
currency risks management techniques advocated in the project finance
context. Some of the measures include political risk insurance with OPIC
and MIGA or even commercial currency swaps by lenders and other project
participants.'" However, our focus is on those measures that should be
undertaken proactively by the host government to mitigate currency risk and
ensure a greater potential for successful projects.
Government measures aimed at mitigating currency risks should be part
of the basic BOT policy framework. We have argued above that as part of
its industrial strategic policy architecture, the government should enact BOT
legislation that provides the framework for all BOT transactions. Mitigating
or even eliminating currency risks should be one of the goals of the BOT
legislation. The BOT legislation must guarantee currency convertibility
under a single exchange rate if multiple exchange rates exist. In addition,
BOT projects should be given equal access to the allocation of foreign
currency as other enterprises and institutions. In short, the host government
must liberalize its exchange controls regime in the project finance and BOT
framework even if there are legitimate economic reasons for general
exchange controls.
A special exchange control liberalization program within the BOT
legislative structure would serve several purposes. It would permit the BOT
process to bypass some of the bureaucratic approval bottlenecks in an area
critical to BOT funding. It would also provide a statutory process that
streamlines and eliminates bureaucratic or administrative decisions or
discretions that are often the source of corruption.18 6 The experience in
183 See HOFFMAN, supra note 117, at 40 (discussing a wide range of currency risks
associated with project finance).
184 See id.; Tiong, supra note 154, at 323.
181 See HOFFMAN, supra note 117, at 44-45.
186 See LANG, supra note 124, at 41-43 (explaining the absence of legislation in some
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some Asian countries suggests that the administrators charged with
implementing these laws must be given clearly defined responsibilities to
prevent bureaucratic graft.18 7 It will be difficult, if not impossible, to get
lender participation if there is little confidence that the necessary foreign
currency would be available for debt service. As such, the BOT legislation
might include the aproval of off-shore accounts and the use of local foreign
currency accounts. Indeed, an off-shore account might be a condition for
foreign lender participation in BOT projects. Legislation that permits such
accounts would impose a legal obligation on the central bank to authorize
the accounts and the amounts of money that could be held in them. In the
case of industrial projects with manufactured export products, purchasers
could then make payments directly to these off-shore accounts from which
various disbursements might be made. The authorization of local foreign
currency accounts would also give BOT projects direct access to foreign
currency to address their foreign currency needs and bypass the bureaucratic
issues associated with exchange controls and central bank allocation of
foreign currency to BOT projects.
D. Infrastructural Risks
The central tenet of the industrial strategic policy architecture for
transforming post-conflict transition countries is an emphasis on industrial
upgrading based on local processing of raw materials, local value-added,
and manufactured exports. An essential element of this policy architecture
is the existence of basic infrastructure such as power plants, roads, and other
public facilities that can support manufacturing activities. One of the
reasons for the miraculous economic performance of the Asian Tigers is the
development of basic infrastructure either through direct public expenditures
or through project finance.189 Unfortunately, one of the major constraints of
post-conflict transition countries is the absence of such basic infrastructure.
Conflict often leaves countries with devastated infrastructure: weak and
unreliable power plants, terrible roads, and inadequate ports and airports.
Therefore, any industrial policy aimed at transforming these countries
through manufacturing facilities must confront the infrastructure problems at
hand.
The host government must then confront the inadequate infrastructural
needs within the industrial strategic policy architecture. Put differently, not
only must the host government implement an industrial upgrading policy,
Asian countries and the politicization of government commitments as a source of corruption
and politicians jockeying for power as a significant hurdle to project finance).
187 Id. at 43-46 (explaining that in China, the administrators did treat contracts as binding,
and although India has a developed legal system, the system of corruption was decentralized).
188 See HOFFMAN, supra note 117, at 45; Tiong, supra note 154, at 323.
189 See Handley, supra note 148, at 209-11; see generally LANG, supra note 124 (devoting
several chapters to power plants and some of the special cases of project finance in Asia).
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but it must simultaneously upgrade its infrastructure as a necessary element
of that policy. Infrastructure development can be undertaken through direct
government expenditures. However, given the financial constraints of post-
conflict transition countries, project finance is the likely candidate for
fulfilling such a need. An examination of the power plants project finance
practices in Asia suggests various models that can be used by the host
country. 190 Indeed, one might argue that the prerequisite for the industrial
strategic policy architecture of any country is the existence of basic
infrastructure. Developing such basic infrastructure would stabilize the
infrastructural needs of the country to meet its current demand, and the
building of a series of BOT industrial projects would create additional
demand for the power generation projects. The sequence of investment
activities in this regard would be critical. With the power plants in
operation, the government can guarantee the power supply to the projects
through various arrangements and techniques common to power plants and
other infrastructure projects.
E. Transfer Risks
The basic premise of the BOT model is the eventual transfer of projects
to local interests. Such a transfer may take place after the project has paid
for itself and the equity investors have received a reasonable return on their
investment. The transfer may also take place after an agreed upon time has
expired. Whatever triggers the eventual transfer, that final phase of BOTs is
not free from risks. Assuming that the project achieves its expected cash
flow levels and lenders and equity investors are fully paid as expected, the
local joint venture partners must now take over the operations. However,
their initial investment in the project will not be sufficient to cover its
current market value. They must come up with additional financing to
purchase the entire facility or invite other local investors to participate in the
venture. The likelihood that they or the other local investors would have
access to capital at a reasonable cost may be low. The host government may
then address this capital scarcity by offering loan guarantees to the local
investors to seek private funding either domestically or in the international
money markets.
If, on the other hand, the transfer is triggered by the expiration of a
fixed contractual term but the lenders and equity investors have not yet been
fully paid, a new set of risks face the private party stakeholders. There will
be no guarantee the facility under new local management will be able to
generate the necessary revenue to pay the outstanding debt and equity
interest. It may well be argued that such a risk of loss is what the lenders
bargained for. However, because BOT contracts are notoriously incomplete,
190 See LANG, supra note 124, at 93 (providing an interesting discussion of the background
and path to success of Hopewell Holdings in the project finance arena; a hotel project gave
rise to the vision of major infrastructural project finance projects).
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certain adjustments should be made to address the equities in the
relationship. A well-constructed BOT contract would have a provision for
adjustments, particularly in the case of a fixed-term contract. In light of this,
the host government may be required to settle the outstanding obligations
and take an equity interest in the project, or to provide a loan or loan
guarantees to the local sponsors and other interested parties to buy out the
foreign private interest. In the alternative, the Dedicated Project Finance
Fund could provide a standby loan guarantee for private parties to acquire
the project.
Other transfer risks might materialize when a fixed contract term
expires. The products of the project may lose their competitiveness in the
market place because of declining demand, changing consumer taste, or
other business conditions. The technology of the project may also be
overtaken by new innovations, thereby increasing cost and dampening price
competitiveness. 19 These market and technology risks might materialize
even when feasibility studies were well-conducted and proven technology
was chosen. Under these circumstances, all the parties and stakeholders face
some risks. The lenders and investors may have to absorb some losses, the
new local owners would inherit an underperforming enterprise, and there
would be little incentive for them to pay off the outstanding debt.
Additionally, the policy objectives of the host government may not be
achieved.
The response to market and technology risks would require some
additional capital outlay by the new local owners. In the case of projects
with flexible factories, changes in demand and consumer preferences may
not affect productivity. The projects may lose some manufacture-to-order
clients but gain others. However, changes in technology can be addressed
by retooling and upgrading through government guaranteed loans. The
response to market and technology risks for industrial projects is less
straightforward. Changes in consumer tastes may require a totally new
product design or lead to a collapse of the project. The cost of responding to
market and technological changes could be substantial, and again, the new
local owners would need substantial financial support in the form of
government guaranteed or subsidized loans to respond to these changes if
the projects can continue to serve the development objectives of the host
country.
X. SHIFTING THE FOCUS OF INCENTIVES IN BOT POLICIES
In his famous book, The Economics of Welfare, Pigou advanced the
broad conceptual basis for incentives granted to enterprises to correct for the
greater social returns on private investment than the private returns received
191 See Farrell, supra note 156, at 550.
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by the investors.192 According to Pigou, private investment might result in
positive externalities such as economies of scale, an increase in new
knowledge, and new herd-mentality-induced-investment generated by the
initial investment. Whatever the private returns on investment might be,
they will not reflect these positive externalities because the market is
incapable of rewarding such contributions. Incentives are therefore
necessary to correct for these unrewarded contributions. In more recent
times, others have advanced what might be termed a dynamic growth
development thesis for incentives. 19 3 They argue that incentives might be
appropriate within the context of growth and development dynamics in
developing countries. In their formative stages, industries in developing
countries may face higher cost and other challenges and constraints
characteristic of countries forging their industrial paths through infant
industries. Incentives might play an essential role of supporting these
industries at their formative stages. 9 4 Such was the experience of Japan and
many other Asian economies that followed their extraordinary
transformation. The question is whether these two broad conceptual
frameworks can support the case for incentives for FDI in post-conflict
transition countries and if so, in what form.
In response to the question posed about the relevance of incentives, it
should be noted briefly that neither Pigou's theory of incentives nor the
dynamic development version of it endorses a blanket use of incentives.
Both theories are purposive. Under Pigou's theory, incentives are not
necessarily inducements for investments that would otherwise not have been
made. Rather, incentives correct under-rewarded investments for their
positive externalities. The theory does not necessarily assume that the
investment would not be made. If this interpretation is sound, investments
with known or a high likelihood of negative externalities should not be
candidates for incentives under this theory. Similarly, the dynamic
development theory of incentives would not necessarily support incentives if
the development prospects of an infant industry are not probable or feasible
under the circumstances.
A. A Brief Historical Review of Incentives
Notwithstanding the general conceptual framework advanced by Pigou
and the dynamic growth and development theory of incentives, the theory of
incentives for FDI is less settled than the practice by host countries.195 For
decades, numerous theoretical and empirical studies have challenged the
192 See generally ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920).
19 See generally UNCTAD, Incentives and Foreign Direct Investment, U.N. Doc.




195 Id at 30.
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theoretical basis for incentives, questioned the efficacy of incentives for
FDI, and doubted the causal link between incentives and the actual
investment behavior of investors.1 96 Indeed, in an earlier study, we provided
a comprehensive review of contemporary legal survey and economic studies
on the efficacy of tax incentives in the FDI process. 197 The survey studies
covered a broad geographic area, stretching from North America to Europe
in developed countries and from Latin America to Africa and Asia in
developing countries. Similarly, these studies covered a long time frame,
running from the 1920s to the 1980s. Consistent in all of these studies were
findings that tax incentives had little, if any, impact on FDI location decision
process. 198 One of the earliest econometric time-series analysis of the
impact of incentives on investment behavior could not confirm
unambiguously the efficacy of incentives in attracting FDI.199 More recent
survey studies and other rigorous econometric time-series analysis of the
same question have yielded substantially the same results: tax incentives do
not have an impact on the location decisions of FDI.200 The results of these
survey studies are hardly surprising. Survey studies always run the risk of
manipulation by respondents motivated by objectives other than rational
investment decisions. 201  For instance, in a study of the tax holidays
experience of Indonesia, Louis T. Wells and Nancy J. Allen reported that
although the Japanese firms complained bitterly about the repeal of the tax
holidays in Indonesia, Japanese investments continued to grow rapidly.202
This clearly confirms the argument that tax incentives are often redundant in
196 See Yelpaala, Efficacy of Tax Incentives, supra note 10 (discussing the weak
theoretical basis of tax incentives); see also George E. Lent, Tax Incentives in Developing
Countries, in READINGS ON TAXATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 363, 370 (Richard Bird &
Oliver Oldman eds., 1975); GRANT L. REUBER, PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN
DEVELOPMENT 128-29 (1973); Patrick L. Kelley, Tax Treaties Between the United States and
Developing Countries: The Need for a New U.S. Initiative, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 159, 161
(1971); Stanley S. Surrey, Current Issues in the Taxation of Corporate Foreign Investment,
56 COLUM. L. REV. 815, 843-46 (1956).
197 See Yelpaala, Efficacy of Tax Incentives, supra note 10, at 396.
' See id. at 396-413.
199 Yelpaala, Dissertation, supra note 79, at 386-94 (arguing that incentives have at best
negative and positive effects depending on the type and the context of the investment).
200 See Louis T. Wells, Jr. & Nancy J. Allen, Tax Holidays to Attract Foreign Direct
Investment: Lessons from Two Experiments, in USING TAX INCENTIVES TO COMPETE FOR
FOREIGN INVESTMENT: ARE THEY WORTH THE COST? 1, 8-15 (Louis T. Wells, Jr. et al. eds.,
2001) (detailing empirical findings that upon removing tax holidays in 1980, FDI in
Indonesia increased); Jacques Morisset & Neda Pimia, How Tax Policy and Incentives Affect
Foreign Direct Investment: A Review, in USING TAX INCENTIVES TO COMPETE FOR FOREIGN
INVESTMENT: ARE THEY WORTH THE COST? 69, 77 (Louis T. Wells, Jr. et al. eds., 2001)
(arguing that most econometric studies tend to support the results of the survey studies).
201 See Yelpaala, Efficacy of Tax Incentives, supra note 10, at 403 (arguing that surveys
allow business executives to reveal their subjective preferences which may have nothing to
do with their objective decision processes).
202 Wells & Allen, supra note 200, at 14.
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that the investment would be made without them.203
Although the theory and empirical evidence seem to point in one
direction, host countries competing for scarce FDI resources seem to be
looking in the opposite direction. Since the 1990s, there has been a
remarkable and almost irreversible competition for FDI through generous
incentives. According to Andrew Charlton, the competition is so pervasive
that countries, states within federal systems, regional trade organizations,
and even regions within countries find themselves pitched against one
another with generous incentives for wooing FDI.204 A 1994 UNCTAD
study of 103 countries found that only four of them did not offer any
incentives for investments. 205 The intense competition for FDI has also led
to a global legislative movement towards the liberalization of the foreign
investment climate and regulatory regime in many countries. According to
the UNCTAD World Investment Report of 2000, out of about 1,035 changes
in the regulatory environment worldwide, about 94% made the legal
environment more favorable.206 Globally, there is growing convergence and
harmonization of the regulatory environment towards more favorable
treatment of investors. It is important to note that most measures undertaken
by countries were liberalization measures made from the perspective of the
dynamic growth and development thesis. This is the context in which we
shall approach the case for incentives in post-conflict transition countries.
The history of disappointing performance of incentives in attracting
FDI compels caution in crafting any policy prescriptions for post-conflict
transition countries. The case for caution is further bolstered by the fact that
decades of liberalization of investment regimes worldwide has yet to bear
fruits in FDI inflows. The proliferation of bilateral investment treaties in
developing countries as instruments for investment protection and
promotion seems to make little difference in attracting FDI to developing
countries.207 However, incentives impose a direct and indirect cost to host
203 See Yelpaala, Efficacy of Tax Incentives, supra note 10, at 392; Wells & Allen, supra
note 200, at 8-15.
204 See generally Andrew Charlton, Incentive Bidding for Mobile Investment: Economic
Consequences and Potential Responses (OECD Dev. Ctr., Working Paper No. 203, 2003),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/63/2492289.pdf (offering a review of the
nature of the worldwide competition for FDI through incentives). For more on the situation
in the United States, see generally Steven R. Kale, U.S. Industrial Development Incentives
and Manufacturing Growth during the 1970s, 15 GROWTH & CHANGE 26 (1984).
205 See UNCTAD, Incentives and FDI, supra note 193, at 10.
206 UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2000, supra note 25, at 1. According to this
UNCTAD report, efforts to attract investment included the conclusion of bilateral investment
treaties which increased tremendously between 1980 and 1999. In 1980, there were 181
bilateral investment treaties concluded. By 1999, the number had increased more than
tenfold to 1,856. Double taxation treaties increase from 719 in 1980 to 1,982 by the end of
1999. Id.
207 See UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2003, supra note 26, at 36. According to
this report, as of 2003 the conclusion of at least 533 bilateral investment treaties ("BITs") in
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countries without the necessary corresponding benefits. Incentives are not
only a burden on the treasuries of the host countries but also work as reverse
subsidies of affluent countries and their investors.2 08 For this to continue,
there must be some rational justification. It therefore seems incumbent on
any investment policy design with an objective to attract FDI through
incentives to investigate why these incentives have not worked.
B. The Framework for Incentives in the BOT Model
The policy architecture for transforming post-conflict transition
countries advocated in this study does not rely on conventional FDI as a
primary instrument. Its focus on the combination of substantial debt and
some equity in economic development suggests that conventional incentive
policy levers would be unsuitable for the task at hand. That
notwithstanding, any design of an incentives policy framework must start
with the reasons incentives have failed to be effective and respond to them
accordingly.
As is apparent from the discussion above, several reasons have been
suggested for the ineffectiveness of incentives. The first line of reasoning
traces the problem to the theoretical basis upon which incentive policies are
designed. Incentives do not address the real determinants of FDI such as
market size, the possession of exploitable intangible assets, or the
imperatives of circumventing costly open market transactions burdened b
uncertainties and chronic market failures that require internalization.2
Distilled from these theory-based arguments is a simple but powerful
suggestion that incentives and their policy constructs are often misguided,
which is an observation that policymakers cannot ignore. Incentives are
misguided when they are not aimed at known or proven impediments to, or
the real motivations for, FDI. Rather, most incentives tend to be general in
the sense that they are made available to all qualifying investors who are not
always required, if ever, to make a positive contribution to any
developmental objectives or address any specific national problem. Even
when incentives are targeted at specific industries, investment activities,
technological contribution, or labor absorption investments, they still retain
their basic general characteristics.
Incentives also face other problems. Most incentive regimes
Africa translated into an average of ten BITs per country. In addition, African countries had,
by the end of 2002, concluded 365 double taxation treaties ("DTTs") at the rate of about
seven DTTs per country. Id.; see also Kojo Yelpaala, Fundamentalism in Public Health and
Safety in Bilateral Investment Treaties [Part 1], 3 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL'Y
235, 235-39 (2008) (providing statistical evidence of the proliferation of bilateral investment
treaties since the 1950s).
208 See Yelpaala, Efficacy of Tax Incentives, supra note 10, at 388, 392; Wells & Allen,
supra note 200, at viii.
209 See generally Yelpaala, Alternatives to Tax Incentive, supra note 57; BUCKLEY &
CASSON, supra note 57.
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disaggregate the responsibilities of granting incentives from those of
assessing their costs. Investment promotion agencies, charged with the
single task of increasing investment flows, are eager to grant incentives to
achieve that goal. However, investment promotion goals may be pursued
without considering the cost of incentives to society and the treasury.
Moreover, incentive schemes tend to give discretionary powers to
administrators. The consensus seems to be that discretion-based incentives
tend to fail because they are prone to induce corruption, additional costs, and
other abuses that discourage serious investors from pursuing the
incentives. 1
The misguided nature of general incentives should be eliminated within
the context of the industrial strategic policy architecture advocated in this
study. To the extent that projects are chosen based on their potential
contribution to some developmental goals of the host country, there are
greater opportunities to make incentives work. As a start, any incentives
regime must be specific to each type of project. Because projects differ by
type and level of complexity, the incentives can be tailored to the needs of
each project. Generality and redundancy in incentives can be eliminated by
subjecting incentives to the cost-and-benefits analysis within the capital
budgeting process of each project. For instance, incentives may be given for
training a specific number and caliber of technical and managerial personnel
per year for the project. Incentives can also be given based on the value of
manufactured exports per annum generated by the project. Both of these are
performance-based, and their costs and benefits can be estimated within the
capital budgeting process.
The central theme of any incentive regime is to encourage investment
that would otherwise not take place. The goal of the incentive regime within
the project finance and BOT context should be to channel potential sponsors
and other equity investors towards specific projects for the achievement of
certain development objectives. Thus, the basis for any specific incentives
should be some quid pro quo between the incentive recipients and the host
government. Each incentive or incentive type can more easily be assessed in
terms of cost and benefits if some bargain for exchange formula is used.
Achieving such quid pro quo may not be easy, but attempting to do so
would compel a higher level of transparency and deliberateness in the grant
of incentives.
One of the drawbacks of general incentives is that they tend not to take
into account the fact that not all development incentives are perfect
substitutes for one another. Different incentives have different levels of
value to the investor and cost to the host government. 21' Low-value
210 See Wells & Allen, supra note 200, at 36 (arguing that a highly discretionary approach
to incentives may be doomed to fail).
211 David W. Rasmussen et al., A Methodology for Selecting Economic Development
Incentives, 15 GROWTH & CHANGE 18, 24 (1984) (arguing that different incentives have
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incentives in whatever form they come are unlikely to be effective, although
they impose a cost on the treasury of a host government. However, when
the project is chosen, the specific investors will be known, and their
incentive preferences or the incentives that would work best in the specific
context can be identified. A requirement for some quid pro quo would
compel tighter scrutiny of incentives and increase their likelihood of
efficacy.
The BOT model can also effectively address problems associated with
highly discretionary incentive regimes. We have already argued that BOT
legislation is essential to provide a clear and concrete regulatory framework
for project participants. One of the goals of such legislation is to reduce the
exercise of discretionary power, which is often the source of corruption.
The general framework for incentives should be designed within the BOT
legislation with the goal of reducing discretionary incentives. Categories of
incentives might be earmarked for different project types as long as their use
is contingent on the cost-and-benefits analysis within the capital budgeting
process of each project. The use of incentives and qualifying investors
might involve limited discretion, but ultimately, the grant of incentives
would still be subjected to the rigors of the capital budgeting process.
C. Summary
In summary, the goal of this brief historical survey and analysis of
incentives for FDI is to suggest that there is a need to shift the focus of
development incentives. After almost a century of investigation, the
evidence points to the conclusion that economic development incentives are
hardly ever effective, even as they visit costs on the host government. In the
face of such evidence, the case for the use of incentives by post-conflict
transition countries must be compelling or at least ensure their success. We
have argued that to make incentives relevant to the development goals of
post-conflict transition countries, certain conditions must be met. The use of
incentives must be guided by a BOT legislative framework that diminishes
significantly the role of discretion in the granting of incentives. Within the
context of the BOT model, incentives must be specific and deliberate as to
projects targeted and their contribution to the goals of the host country. The
efficacy of incentives in terms of the benefits and costs to all parties will be
enhanced if each incentive is based on a quid pro quo arrangement and
assessed within the rigors of the capital budgeting process of each project.
This approach allows each country to tailor its incentives regime to the
needs of its economy and its industrial strategic policy architecture.
XI. CONCLUSION
Several post-conflict transition countries where people are living on
different values to investors and impose different costs on the granting public institution).
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less than two dollars a day are some of the poorest countries in the world.
Such abject poverty in a world where affluent nations wallow in
transcendent abundance is unacceptable and demands a response as a moral
or humanitarian imperative. In 2000, all members of the United Nations
adopted the Millennium Development Declaration and Goals ("MDGs")
aimed at, among many others, eradicating extreme poverty and hunger. The
MDGs stand as a colossal beacon inviting the attention of any person
charged with constructing a blueprint for the transformation of post-conflict
transition countries. Nevertheless, the achievement of the MDGs remained
largely elusive by 2005.
The MDGs do not, and cannot, claim a monopoly over the concerns or
the solutions for poverty eradication in the world. Clamoring for equal
attention in any poverty eradication policy design and directed objectives are
two other very popular instruments: (1) Official Development Aid ("ODA");
and (2) FDI. ODA programs are best exemplified by the Blair Commission
Report of March 2005, presented at the G8 Conference in Scotland and
calling for the end of poverty in Africa. Every year, the G8 focuses on
addressing development needs through ODA. The G8 Conference of 2008,
held in Hokkaido, Japan, continued to pursue ODA as an instrument for
addressing poverty and development. Given the historically central role
assigned to ODA in development, logic would dictate that ODA must be in
play in any industrial strategic policy architecture with the goal of
transforming post-conflict transition countries. After all, most, if not all, of
them are the targets of ODA and poverty alleviation measures. Many have
also assigned a significant role to FDI in the achievement of economic
development goals.
In this paper, we reject these approaches as the starting point for
crafting industrial policies for transforming post-conflict transition
countries. In doing so, we do not reject the necessity for poverty alleviation.
The real question is, what is the most effective way of putting these
countries on the path to sustained economic self-transformation over time
such that poverty does not remain a burning and recurrent issue? After
decades of ODA programs, poor countries have remained poor, and some
have become even poorer relative to their own history and in relation to the
rest of the world. Although the poverty alleviation policies may often be
well-intentioned, unimpeachably humanitarian, and passionately argued, at
their core they are mostly minimalist both in intent and potential impact.
Poverty alleviation instruments would have greater effects within a larger
industrial framework that focuses on empowering the entire economy
through projects and industries with the potential for the greatest
development impact. Conventional FDI instruments may also be misplaced
both in post-conflict transition countries and in other developing countries.
An understanding of the system's characteristics, strategic vision, and the
mission of MNEs would suggest that one should not put the developmental
burden of countries on MNEs when, as direct instruments, they are not well-
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suited for that task. This also does not mean that FDI cannot play a role. It
only means that the role FDI plays must be complementary and should not
be left to the investors. It must be guided by the industrial strategic policy
architecture of the host country.
In view of the arguments advanced above, we conclude that the
industrial strategic policy architecture for transforming post-conflict
transition countries must focus on big prizes-that is, investing in and
developing industries and projects with the greatest potential impact on
economic development that empowers the local economy and entrepreneurs.
A policy that keeps its focus on big prizes in the economy is not the same as
the current emphasis in certain development circles on "big push." The
basic policy framework for countries with abundant natural and human
resources should be to avoid exporting any commodities, products or ideas
unprocessed. These countries must seek out investment opportunities with
the greatest potential for value-added-technology, knowledge transfer, and
the generation of meaningful linkages with local economies. Even countries
with meager economic resources should reconsider how they fit into the
utilization of the vast global resources for their development. The real
reasons for poverty might only be the poverty of imagination.
To achieve these goals, we propose the use of the project finance and
BOT models. Under these models, industrial projects that can pay for
themselves will be funded substantially through non-recourse or limited-
recourse debt and some equity. The projects will be turned over to local
owners after they have paid for themselves. In this process, the host
government provides an effective guiding hand in the selection of industries
and projects that serve its development goals. This approach is not free
from risks but at least the host governments will take charge of their
economic destiny.
Also under this approach, some of the ODA financial resources that
have so far proved to be ineffective can be put to a different use through a
dedicated Fund. Such a Fund will finance BOT projects and support private
entrepreneurial investment activities. The Fund could produce several
benefits: (1) it would provide direct support to carefully selected home-
grown economic development projects; (2) it could lend great support to the
creation of self-reliant local private industries and an entrepreneurial class
which is essential for sustained economic development; and (3) it could
break the circle of wasteful and corrupt ODA expenditures with little to
show for them.
Finally, no economic development model is without risks. Certainly,
there is no silver bullet. However, the need for altering the position of the
poorest countries in the global economy demands the use of bold and non-
conventional techniques that have worked in other regions of the world.
Indeed, although this model is designed for post-conflict transition countries,
the basic approach has utility in many developing countries with or without
abundant natural and human resources. One only has to look at the
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examples of the Asian Miracles with diverse cultures and historical
experiences. We maintain that their incredible economic transformation was
not just a simple function of culture but also sound policy choices.
99

